PAKISTAN MILITARY AND POLITICAL NEWS

Dumb Plagiary-Pakistan Army Style

2011-08-07T23:02:00.001-07:00

The plagiary has been committed so thoughtlessly that even end note number 44 that Major A.H Amin gave in his original article is visible.

The same is visible on defence pk website also where it was posted from Pakistan Army website

Pakistan Army website

http://www.pakistanarmy.gov.pk/awpreview/textcontent.aspx?pid=18

Pakistan Army > Pakistan Army > Journey from Scratch to Nuclear Power

Introduction

The Pakistan Army came into being as a result of the amalgamation of the Muslim troops of the pre-independence British Indian Army. The origin of many of its units dates back to the beginning of the British rule in the subcontinent. This relation, however, is merely of historical nature. With the birth of Pakistan, a hotchpotch of the ill-equipped and ill-organized troops, breaking away from the old and established British Indian Army, had been transformed into a disciplined fighting force in consonance with the national ideals and aspirations.

On 3 June 1947, the British Government announced the plan for the partition of the sub-continent between India and Pakistan, and for the transfer of power to the two new states on 15 August 1947. On 30 June 1947, the procedure for the division of the armed forces was agreed upon by the Partition Council, chaired by the Viceroy of India Lord Mountbatten and consisting of the top leaders of the Muslim League and the Indian Congress. Field Marshal Auchinleck, then C-in-C India, was appointed Supreme Commander under Mountbatten to ensure smooth division of units, stores, and so on. It was announced on 1 July 1947, that both countries would have operational control of their respective armed forces by 15 August 1947.

The Early Years

Between 1939 and 1945, the strength of the Indian Army grew to a maximum of 2,018,196 personnel. On the eve of Partition in 1947, the figure had come down to about 11,800 officers, 450,000 other ranks plus about 50,000 of Indian Princely States' Forces. It is noteworthy, at that time (as per policy of the British Raj since 1857) there were only two completely Muslim combat units (1/15 Punjab Regiment and 3/16 Punjab Regiment), although there were several completely Hindu and Sikh units and regiments of the combat arms. The original agreement called for the armed forces and other assets to be divided to the ratio of 64% for India and 36% for Pakistan, but Pakistan was later forced to accept an 1/3 share of assets. Of the total 46 training establishments; only nine were located in Pakistan; all of the 17 Ordnance Factories were located in India, as were most of the Ordnance Depots and Engineer Store Depots. In addition to Pakistan receiving far less stores than originally stipulated, most of the stores received were of general nature, perishable, unwanted and obsolete. The move of 150,000 Pakistani personnel as well as 508 units and sub units of various sizes was to be carried out by rail through Indian Punjab and Sikh Princely States.

After 53 trains carrying personnel and their families were attacked, detailed and massacred by armed bands of Sikhs and Hindus in connivance with the railway authorities, the sea route from Bombay to Karachi was adopted. The Punjab Boundary Force consisting of five brigades under Major General Rees was created by Field Marshal Auchinleck's Supreme HQ in August-1947 to escort refugees from border districts of the two Punjabs across the international borders. Its area of responsibility covered 37,500 square miles and a population of 14.5 million. It was a gigantic task for a limited force manned largely by neutral British officers. About seven million Muslims migrated to Pakistan, and five million Sikhs and Hindus to India; a million perished.

Against an estimated requirement for about 4,000 officers, Pakistan had initially only about 2,300 - the gap being filled up on Quaid-e-Azam's appeal, to some extent, by 484 experienced and qualified British officers, who volunteered to stay and help Pakistan and the Pakistan Army in difficult times. Many Polish and Hungarian officers also volunteered for the medical corps. Prior to August 1947, the most senior Pakistani (and Indian) officers were in ranks of brigadiers; after independence, the command of Army units had to be given to officers in their early 30s with eighteen years service, many of whom had combat experience and had won battlefield awards in World War II. Similarly, brigade commanders had 13-15 years service and division commanders 19-20 years.


		Out of the Northern Command HQ nucleus, the GHQ was organized at its present location. Lt Gen Messervy, the then GOC-in-C Northern Command, was promoted and appointed Commander-In-Chief (C-in-C) Pakistan Army. The GHQ started functioning on 15 August 1947 without adequate staff or records, these held back in New Delhi.

By October 1947, guarding 5,000 miles of West and East Pakistan's frontiers were, about ten infantry brigades at less than 50% strength, and an armoured brigade with only 13 running STUART tanks. The Army has ammunition reserves for less than one week. In a Joint Defence Council Meeting, both Mountbatten and Supreme Commander Auchinleck had made it clear to Pakistan that in case of war with India, no other member of the Commonwealth would come to Pakistan's help. Field Marshal Ayub Khan, the first Pakistani C-in-C, was to recall in later years: "It would always be a matter of pride and glory for this army when history will recall how heavy a burden was placed on its young shoulders and how creditably it always rose to the occasion".

After the fraudulent accession of Kashmir by the Maharaja on 27 October, Mountbatten and Nehru air-transported the Indian Army into the Sri Nagar Valley. The Indian Army's offensive was halted at the Ceasefire Line (now Line of Control) Initially by Azad Kashmir Forces, and from April 1948 with support of the iII-organised Pakistan Army without adequate logistic support. At midnight on 30 December, GHQ India asked for a ceasefire to become effective on 1 January 1949. Pakistan accepted, as the fate of Jammu and Kashmir had been taken over by the UNO. Thus ended the six month war in Kashmir. By the end of 1948 five infantry divisions had been organised, but these were still lacking their full complement of supporting arms and services. The few artillery regiments received at partition were grouped into three Artillery Groups under independent headquarters to ensure maximum flexibility. By early 1949, the Pakistan Army had completed its formative stage and had been bloodied in battle experience, and continued its re-organisation. On integration of Bahawalpur State in January 1949, the 6th (B) Division was created, but this was subsequently disbanded in 1956 on re-organisation of the army.

Back in August 1947, Quaid-e-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah, foreseeing the financial and military difficulties ahead, asked for US economic and military aid. Incidentally, the same request had also been submitted by New Delhi and Kabul. After an evaluation of Pakistan's strategic location at the crossroads of South-, Central-and West Asia in proximity to both China and the Soviet Union, the USA acceded to Pakistan's request under the American Mutual Security Legislation. In early 1954, Pakistan and the USA signed a Mutual Defence Assistance Agreement.Between 1954 -1965, Pakistan received US$650 million in military grants, US$619 million in defence support assistance, and US$ 55 million in cash or commercial purchases. This aid enhanced Pakistani defence capability by increasing the firepower and mobility, and improving C³1 facilities of five and a half divisions. The armed forces were modernised in keeping with the world trends; two Corps HQ were also catered for. Many senior and junior officers went for training and orientation to USA; new cantonments were built, and existing ones were expanded and modernised. By August 1947, the 7th Division (located in Rawalpindi with two brigades) was the Pakistan Army's only division. There also were static HQ designed "Areas" and "Sub-areas", having brigades and battalions at more than 50% below strength.

In the following months, as Pakistani personnel kept arriving from all over India, Middle East and South East Asia by rail and sea, the 8th Division was organised out of the Sind Balochistan Area, and the 9th (F) Division was created out of brigades of the Peshawar and Waziristan Areas. Similarly, the Lahore Area was re-organised as 10th Division, and the 12th Division was raised in November 1948. The forces in East Pakistan (now Bangladesh) were designated as East Pakistan Army, then as a Sub-area and finally in December 1948 as HQ 14th Division, initially with only two battalions that eventually were built up to brigade strength.

Kashmir War 1947-48

The 11 Cavalry equipped with armoured cars were the only unit employed in the war.

The GHQ assigned the unit an essentially defensive and passive role but the indomitable Colonel Tommy Masud commanding the unit was too resolute a man to be restrained 44. The unit thus took a prominent part in operations in Bhimbhar-Mirpur area under Tommy Masud, but its role remained limited since it was not allowed to conduct any major offensive operation to support the militia.The Pakistani GHQ finally moved 3rd Armoured Brigade near Bhimbhar, for a projected counterstroke at Indian communications to Poonch, when the Indians made a unilateral offer of ceasefire on 30 December 1947-1948.

The Rann of Kutch Conflict (April 1965)

India and Pakistan became engaged in a short but sharp conflict into Pakistani claimed-area in the Rann of Kutch in April 1965. Both armies had fully mobilised. Pakistan eventually proposed a ceasefire, which India accepted; an agreement was signed, and the forces disengaged. The Award by the Arbitration Tribunal vindicated Pakistan's position. India then shifted the centre of gravity of operations to the Northern Areas.

The 1965 War

After several ceasefire violations, India attacked across the international border form Sialkot to Sind sectors. The attacks were halted on all fronts, and in a series of counterattacks the Pakistan Army penetrated inside Indian territory capturing more territory than the Indian Army. The biggest tank battle since World War II was fought at Chawinda, inflicting heavy casualties. India eventually asked for a ceasefire, arranged by the UN on 23 September 1965.

The Third Evolution Phase (1966-1970)

In 1966, commenced the third phase of the evolution of the Pakistan Army, which was able to at least partially enhance its defence capability over these five years.

The US embargo on military aid to Pakistan, and the continued Soviet heavy build-up of Indian forces, forced Pakistan to turn to China, North Korea, Germany, Italy and France for its defence procurement programmes. China, a time-tested friend and neighbour, enabled Pakistan to raise three fully-equipped infantry divisions with gun and vehicles, 900 Chinese tanks, and MiG-19F aircraft for the air force. France supplied MIRAGE aircraft and submarines. In 1968, the Soviet Union offered US$30 million worth of aid to Pakistan and supplied 100 T-55 tanks, Mi-8 helicopter, guns and vehicles; in 1969, however, Soviet support was abruptly stopped under Indian pressure.

The 1971 War

Widespread insurgency broke out, covertly aided by Indian trained infiltrators and India's Border Security Forces. In the first week of April, personnel of two infantry divisions and civil armed forces were airlifted in Pakistan International Airlines (PIA) planes with a 6,000-mile non-stop route via Sri Lanka - the longest operational air move by the army. Quick reaction by the Pakistani authorities restored 80% normalcy in the eastern wing of the country. Covert operations having failed, India concentrated about 400,000 regular army personnel in 12 divisions supported by five tank regiments, seven air force squadrons and Indian Navy. These forces, further strengthened by about 1,00,000 guerillas (Mukti Bahini) attacked from all directions on 20 fronts across the international border on 21 November, without a formal declaration of war. Intense fighting raged till 16 December in both Pakistan's wings; no town or battalion position could be overrun, till a ceasefire accepted by Pakistan was perfidiously changed into surrender by Indian-Soviet machinations.

1971-1979

After almost twelve years of clandestine efforts India exploded a nuclear device at Pokhran on 18 May 1974 not far from Pakistan’s borders, as part of her coercive diplomacy, thus starting a nuclear arms race in the Sub-continent. By 1986, after only seven years of a crash programme, Pakistan had acquired her own nuclear capability to match and deter that of India.Thus was established a strategic balance in the region, ‘striking terror into the hearts of the enemy’ as enjoined by the Holy Quran.

In 1976, the Higher Defence Organization was streamlined and revitalized. The western influenced strategic doctrine was critically analyzed and re-evaluated in the light of our geostrategic realities and operational environment. Core issues of Quranic concepts of warfare, regulated by laws like Jehad, checks and balances on use of force, prohibition of total unlimited war, humane measures to protect women, children and prisoners, encouraging negotiations for honourable peace and that enemies need not be permanent, and other fundamentals were highlighted in the re-evaluation.

1979 To Present

In December 1979, the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan. The US offered US$400 million worth of military aid, which was however spurned by Pakistan as inadequate for a "frontline state".

Apprehensive of the two front threats to Pakistan, in 1981 the US again offered a package of US$1.5 billion worth of military aid. This was accepted and in five years provided 40 F-16 fighters, 100 M-48 tanks, 64 M-109 155mm SP howitzers, 40 M110 203mm SP howitzers, 75 towed howitzers, and 1,005 TOW anti-tank missile systems, considerably enhancing Pakistan's defence capability. India and Pakistan are now engaged into a military conflict on the world's highest battlefield in 1982 resulting into more loss of lives due to harsh weather as compare to combat losses.

By 1989, the Soviet Union - having suffered heavy losses in men and material, and unable to withstand the Jehad - commenced withdrawing its forces from Afghanistan. Under the Pressler Amendment, the US again imposed an embargo on all economic and military aid to Pakistan, which continued for five years. In 1995, the Brown Amendment authorised a one-time delivery of US military equipment, contracted for prior to October 1990, worth US$368 million. However, the additional 28 F-16 aircraft costing US$658 million and already paid for by Pakistan are still not being delivered.

Other Significant Activities

Roles under UN Flag

In addition to its main roles of repelling external aggressions and grappling with internal security issues, natural calamities, and nation-building projects, the Pakistan Army from 1960 onwards also played a heroic role as part of UN forces in peacekeeping, peacemaking and peace-enforcing, providing personnel to several different missions.

Military Missions Abroad

Pakistani military missions were invited, during the last four decades by the governments of Libya, Saudi Arabia, UAE, Ghana, Zimbabwe, Jordan and others to organise and train their armed forces. In the Gulf War of 1991, Pakistani ground forces played their role in Saudi Arabia's defence, and thereafter in prolonged mine lifting operations in Kuwait. In the medical field, Pakistan Army doctors have been working as personal physicians to Kings and Rulers in the Arab world.

Joint Exercises

Periodically since 1955, first as members of collective security systems such as SEATO and CENTO, the Pakistan Army, Navy and Air Forces took part in exercises with forces of friendly countries, gaining valuable experience in latest systems and doctrines.

Training of Foreign Army Officers in Pakistan

The numerous training institutions of various arms and services set up after 1947 have become such centres of professional excellence, i.e., the Pakistani Military Academy, School of Infantry and Tactics, Armour, Artillery, Army Air Defence, Engineer, and Signals Schools and Colleges, Command and Staff College, National Defence College, and others. These institutions are regularly visited by foreign army officers, who are trained alongside their Pakistani colleagues.

Para-Military Forces

Pakistan Army officers train and command the following para-military forces: National Guard (including Janbaz Force), Mujahid Force, National Cadet Corps and Women Guards (185,000), Frontier Corps (70,000), Pakistan Rangers (25,000), and Coast Guards.

Indigenisation & Modernisation

The activities of POF Wah and Heavy Industries Taxila are described elsewhere in this issue.

Missiles

To balance the threat posed by India’s Integrated Guided Missile Programme, launched in 1983-84 to develop the PRITHBI, AGNI, AKASH and NAG systems, the Pakistan Army has developed the capability of producing and deploying, at short notice, the indigenous HATF-3 ballistic missile with range of 800km. Pakistan has also developed and introduced into army’s service the ANZA air defence and BAKTAR-SHIKAN anti tank guided missile system.

Army Vehicles

To standardise the various types of vehicles of different origins in use in the army since 1947, the indigenous manufacture of the YASOOB series of military trucks (available in 3 ton and 6 ton medium and heavy duty versions) was launched in 1989 in collaboration with Pakistan Automobile Corporation. 1/4 ton jeeps named MILLAT and NISHAN are also being produced with civil collaboration. Re-engining (diesel) and refurbishment of the large fleet of M-34/M-35 trucks of US origin is also currently being implemented under the SHAHZORE project.

Communications

To meet the challenge of the future battlefield, the Corps of Signals has completely revolutionised defence communications with the introduction of PASCOMS (Pakistan Army Strategic Communications) inaugurated in April 1995, DEFCOMM (Defence Communication) for inter-services communications, and PATCOM (Pakistan Army Tactical Communications). Under the latter programme, all corps have been equipped with hand-held radio sets, VHF vehicles radio sets, low and medium power radio sets, field exchanges and FAX machines. Work is in progress to have a real-time C4I System at all tiers of the Army.

Recruitment and Formation

Since 1947, the Pakistani Armed Forces have grown into a national, highly professional, modern defence arm of the nation. Recruitment for officers and other ranks is open to all sections, classes, castes and tribes who meet the physical and educational standards.

In 1972, the National Defence College commenced the first full fledged course to impart higher military education to senior officers. The National University of Sciences and Technology (NUST) was established in 1993 as a joint venture of the army and civil institutions, with links to the Michigan State University (USA) and Cranfield University (UK) for imparting graduate and post-graduate studies and PhD/MS programmes. It is based on the decentralised multi-campus concept and has the following affiliated colleges: Military College of Engineering (Risalpur), Military College of Signals (Rawalpindi), Military College of Electrical and Mechanical Engineering (Rawalpindi), Military College of Transport (Risalpur), Pakistan Navy Engineering College (Karachi), and PAF College of Aeronautical Engineering (Risalpur).

The Role in the Social Sector

The Pakistan Army, in addition to its primary responsibility of defence and security, is also playing its its role in the social sector and in nation-building activities through the Fauji Foundation, Army Welfare Trust, Frontier Works Organization, Special Communication Organization and the National Logistics Cell, and in assisting in alleviation of suffering and succour in natural calamities like floods, earthquakes, etc.

Nation Building Programme

The Founder of the nation extended full patronage to the Pakistan Army in particular and the allied services in general and asked the defence forces to defend not only the territorial integrity of the country but also its ideological frontiers. From the very outset, the Pakistan Army has been dedicated to the service of the nation. Through its innumerable services and excellent performance in the completion of nation-building projects, the Pakistan Army has won the confidence and respect of the nation with the grace of Almighty Allah.

Besides carrying out its basic duty of defending the country, the Pakistan Army has played a pivotal role in a number of nation-building projects. Some of these are; Building of road-networks in the inaccessible Northern Area, Azad Kashmir, Baluchistan. On a number of occasions, the army has conducted rescue operations during the great floods. Again it has also conducted anti-locust, anti-boar and anti-smuggling operations.

Earthquake - 2005

Never before has Pakistan experienced such a big catastrophe as the earthquake of 8 October 2005 that shattered the vital areas of Azad Kashmir, NWFP and Islamabad. The overwhelming response of the Army had been admirable, this reflected the total devotion and commitment to uphold the flag of Pakistan at any cost within minutes after earthquake, Army Aviation Helicopters were in the air in order to assess damage and bring back injured casualties. All the main roads in Muzaffarabad were reopened after 36 hours of the earthquake. Fifty satellite phone PCOs in Kashmir and 60 in affected areas of NWFP had been installed for the convenience of people to make and receive calls free of cost. Around 72 average sorties were flown every day in areas' like Sortir, Lamina, Saropa, Chakothi, Gari Dopatta, Pir Chinari, Billgra, Sawan, Pundu and Hatian Balla villages, while the areas in Neelum Valley where the rescue and relief operations were being carried out include Ghori, Dhani, Ging, Pangkot, Patikkka and Noseri. Relief items, including food, tents and blankets, were being dropped in Chakot, Sudan Gali, Saropa, Neelum Valley and Gari Dopatta. Around 300 truck loads were distributed in Muzaffarabad almost every day.

The Pakistan Army medical staff continued to shift serious patients from quake-hit areas through MI -17, Chinook, Black Hawk, CH-53 and Sea King helicopters. Pak Army's medical teams were working day and night in Muzaffarabad, Rawalakot, Bagh, Balakot and Batagram with a missionary zeal, our troops were working round-the-clock to mitigate sufferings of the millions of survivors. The foreign dignitaries and leaders of political parties who had been visiting the devastated areas were unanimous in lauding the role of our dedicated soldiers in alleviating human sufferings. Mercifully, Pakistan Army had done more than one could expect.

Welfare Projects

The army’s welfare projects and schemes contribute to the national development programme in a big way. The Army Welfare Trust, the Welfare and Rehabilitation Organisation, Armed Services ‘ Board and the Fauji Foundation all serve tens of thousands of nationals in service and after retirement. Besides, free medical services are provided to the citizens in the backward area of the country. The army provides educational facilities to the soldiers and officers. It encourages the servicemen to enhance their education and provides all necessary facilities in the regard. The army offers course in higher education like M. Phil and Ph.D. It runs the National University of Modern Languages which has, on its staff, a large number of foreign instructors. The army trains officers at this institute to further send them to foreign courses. The army has started own Medial College whose graduates will serve the armed forces. In the domain of national education, the army has also contributed in a big way bringing in, efficiency, order and discipline in so far as its management of schools and colleges in the Cantonment areas is concerned. There is a marked improvement in the performance of students and teachers of these institutions and the general administration has been improved remarkably.

Conclusion

The Pakistan Army, like Pakistan, started virtually from a scratch on 14 August 1947, in the face of heavy odds. During these 61 years, the Army, like the Navy and Air Force, has evolved into a highly-motivated and modern force defending the ideological and geographical frontiers of Pakistan.

Quick Links
	Introduction
	The Early Years
	Kashmir War 1947-48
	The Rann of Kutch Conflict (April 1965)
	The 1965 War
	The Third Evolution Phase (1966-1970)
	The 1971 War
	1971-1979
	1979 to Present
	Other Significant Activities
	Para -Military Forces
	Recruitment and Formation
	The Role in the Social Sector
	Nation Building Programme
	Earthquake - 2005

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Major A.H Amins article as printed in Defence Journal Karachi in August 2000

http://www.defencejournal.com/2000/aug/corps.htm

DEFENCE NOTES

Handling of Armour in Indo-Pak War

Pakistan Armoured Corps as a Case Study

Part–I

Maj (Retd) AGHA HUMAYUN AMIN from WASHINGTON DC makes an excellent presentation of how Pak armour was handled in our wars with India.

Introduction

Poor handling of armour at and beyond brigade level in all Indo Pak Wars fought from 1947-48 till 1971 stands out as the principal cause of stagnation and lack of decisiveness in the final outcome of all three Indo Pak wars. On the face value this may appear to be an oversimplified view , however a dispassionate study of the British-Indian military tradition proves that this assertion is far more closer to truth than many military observers and analysts may have realised in actual on ground military analysis as far as military history writing in the Indo Pak scenario is concerned.

In this brief article, we will survey the entire canvas of British-Indo Pak military tradition from the eighteenth century till to date and endeavour to arrive at certain analytical conclusions which may help us in improving doctrine operational philosophy and handling of armour in a future war, or at least in military training.

THE PRE 1947 LEGACY

CAVALRY IN PRE WW ONE BRITISH INDIAN WARS

Cavalry was the decisive arm of battle till at least the 1740s in India. It may be noted that the “superiority of the infantry-artillery team based European way of war, over the cavalry charge based Asiatic way of warfare”1, was, for the first time demonstrated at the Battle of Saint Thome in 1746, where the French-Native troops of the French East India Company, under the Paradis, a Swiss soldier of fortune on the French East India Company’s payroll, brushed aside the much larger and at least outwardly awesome cavalry heavy army of, Anwaruddin, the Nawab of Carnatic. Thus in words of the Cambridge historian “Cavalry could make no impression on troops that kept their ranks and reserved their fire” The terror of Asiatic armies had disappeared2! Cavalry, however, retained its own decisive role at the tactical level as a flank protection and limited attack role on the battlefield and as a protective element and strategic screen /raiding and harassing force at the strategic level. Since the Marathas and Mysore forces of Hyder Ali relied heavily on cavalry as a strategic screen and as a raiding force the British were also forced to raise regular native cavalry regiments. This process started from 1672 but was assumed a significant shape from once the Moghal Horse was raised at Patna in July 1760 under Sardars Mirza Shahbaz Khan and Mirza Tar Beg3. It may be noted that this unit was officered entirely by Indians. The British attitude at this time was that “cavalry was a rather flashy extravagance”4 and they preferred getting it on loan from native rulers rather than having their own Native cavalry units. Thus, in the south the Nawab of Arcot and in the north the Nawab of Oudh were asked by the British to supply cavalry and raise cavalry units for war service with the English East India Company. The British discovered that cavalry taken on loan from the Nawab of Arcot and Nawab of Oudh was unreliable under fire and raised their own native cavalry units in Bengal and Madras officered by Europeans from the mid and late 1770s.5 Cavalry was first seriously recognised as an arm of decision once General Gerard Lake who was basically an infantryman arrived in India in 1801 as C in C Bengal Army . General Lake for the first time organised cavalry as brigades of two units 6. Lake decided to do so since he felt that Maratha cavalry was too efficient vis a vis the company’s cavalry and there was a need for reorganisation and reform. Lake thus gave serious thought to cavalry training and the first major cavalry training manoeuvres in the Company’s military history were held in 1802. Cavalry units were trained hard and the standard set was 45 miles in 24 hours. Lake also increased cavalry’s firepower by attaching two six pounder galloper horse artillery guns to each cavalry regiment.7

The reader may note that while the Bengal Infantry from the beginning was Hindu dominated, cavalry at the outset was a wholly Muslim arm. Such was the Muslim dominance that even the British C in C of Bengal Army8 (also C in C India) Major John Carnac declared that “The Mughals ( Muslim of Central Asian/West of Khyber ancestry) .....are the only good horsemen in India”9. The Bengal infantry from the very beginning had no Bengalis since the English Company had the choice to recruit soldiers of fortune of “Jat” “Rohilla (Hindustani Pathan or anyone with a Pathan ancestry)” Buxarries (Hindu Bhumihar Brahmans from Buxar area in modern Bihar province who had been recruited in Mughal Army also10) Jats (largely Hindustani Hindu but possibly some Muslims) Rajputs (mostly Hindustani Hindu from Oudh and Bihar) and Brahmans11. Even in Britain cavalry was seen as a feudal dominated arm and known as the “arm of fashion and wealth”.12

Cavalry was decisively employed by General Lake in the Second Maratha War, notably at Fatehgarh which was an all cavalry battle.13 Lake brilliantly used cavalry as a lightning leading force to reconnoitre otherwise impregnable Maratha defensive oppositions so that infantry and artillery were used with maximum effect at the decisive moment. Lake often used cavalry to the point of rashness. At the Battle of Delhi he brilliantly employed his cavalry in a feint withdrawal tempting the French trained and led Marathas to leave an otherwise impregnable defensive position to attack the supposedly withdrawing cavalry, while Lake brought up his infantry to counterattack the overconfident Marathas! The Maratha War was a lesson for the British in cavalry’s capabilities as well as limitations. At Laswari where Lake finally decisively defeated the Maratha main army under the Hindustani Pathan Sarwar Khan14, he advanced single-handed with his cavalry against a Maratha army which Lake thought was retreating . His cavalry initially achieved a breakthrough, but was then held up by Maratha artillery fire and Lake was able to finally defeat the Marathas only after his infantry joined him at midday.15 Laswari once again proved that cavalry was not as much of an arm of decision as infantry, for it was the British Indian infantry that finally saved the day at Laswari.

Cavalry was again significantly employed in the Third Maratha/Pindari War. This was essentially a cleanup operation covering thousands of miles and was essentially a war of movement suiting the cavalry. Cavalry was used to locate the Pindaris while infantry was later used to attack and destroy them. The most notable cavalry action of this war took place at Sitabaldi where the 6th Bengal Native Cavalry defeated a much larger combined Maratha-Arab Muslim force singlehandedly.16

Cavalry’s importance started declining from 1817 onwards . Although it performed important reconnaissance and protection duties in the First Afghan War the mountainous terrain and poor logistics limited its role severely. The Sikh Wars were also wholly infantry dominated wars in which Sikhs dug themselves up into entrenchments which were stormed by the British at great human cost. The Second Sikh War was particularly unfortunate for Indian cavalry because of flight of a cavalry brigade of two British and two native units at Chillianwalla which led to a serious British reverse. Cavalry’s role by 1857 was reduced to escorting artillery siege trains, supply convoys and flank protection. Since most of the battles of the Sepoy Rebellion were fought in built up areas cavalry had a limited role.

The most decisive change in Indian Cavalry which started from 1858 was the mixing up of the class composition by the British with a view to reducing chances of any further rebellion. This was done because the Sepoy Rebellion was largely led and sparked by the Hindustani Pathan/Ranghar Muslim units of the Bengal Army. Most notable of all being the seizure of Delhi in the early hours of 11th May 1857, by the 3rd Bengal Native Light Cavalry (raised in 1776) after reducing into shock and inertia a British garrison of one Royal British Army infantry and one cavalry regiment at Meerut on 10th May 1857. The British adopted a firm policy not to have a Muslim dominated cavalry. Thus Cavalry was made a mixed arm after 1857 with almost equal proportions of Hindus, Muslims and Sikhs in each unit The only exception to this rule being two one class units of Muslims and one of Hindus.17

WW ONE

Cavalry remained an arm dominated by rich men more interested in polo and pig sticking from the 1860s till the First World War. Two Indian cavalry divisions were sent to France as part of the allied cavalry corps, but remained largely unemployed with few exceptions like the Hodson’s Horse which was used in mounted infantry role18. One controversial albeit tangible way of gauging Cavalry’s contribution in WW One and Two may be the fact that the lone Victoria Cross won by an Indian cavalry man/Tankman in both world wars out of the total 35 won by Indians was won in France by a Hindu Rajputana Rajput in WW One while performing the duties of a despatch rider19! Indian Cavalry was relatively more decisively used in the Mesopotamian and Palestine Campaigns notably in the final allied offensive in 1918 when General Allenby successfully used cavalry with great effect in the battles of Gaza, Beersheeba etc along with eight British manned tanks20. The Turks were heavily outnumbered in the Palestine Campaign of 1917-18 and there was far more freedom of manoeuvre for cavalry to be employed for carrying out raids and outflanking marches21. The main fighting was, however, done by the infantry and cavalry remained an important but essentially second important arm.

The First World War marked a turning point in warfare. Infantry failed to achieve a breakthrough on the Western Front and its place as the arm of decision was challenged seriously for the first time since the Battle of Crecy (1346). Introduction of tanks in 1916 broke the stalemate despite faulty employment doctrine. However, tanks despite their relatively significant role in the German defeat in World War One failed to achieve a major victory because of mechanical failures and poor employment doctrine.22 The British Army was an infantry/cavalry dominated army and till the end of WW One tanks were still viewed as an important but not as decisive an arm as infantry23. Tanks found an antidote soon. It was at Battle of Cambrai where tanks for the first time, at one of the five points of breakthrough, were effectively engaged and destroyed by a single German Field Artillery Battery which destroyed many tanks by direct fire.24 Tanks played a crucial role at Battle of Amiens in 1918 which was termed by military analysts as turning point of the war and as the “Black Day” of the German Army by General Ludendorff. The true worth of tanks, however, was still not appreciated, since the Germans were able to stabilise their front, thanks to conservative British doctrine of exploiting breakthroughs.25 Although the Royal Tank Corps was created from 28 July 1917, 26 Tanks as an entity did not have any Godfather in the British military hierarchy and this ensured that their true significance was not appreciated at least in the British and Indian Army. Once the allied armies were demobilised the tank was forgotten and the old generals once again elevated infantry to the role of arm of decision.

INTER WAR

YEARS-1918-39

First World War brought very few changes in the Indian Army and the Indian Army remained an infantry cavalry army retaining twenty one Horse Cavalry regiments27 after the 1920-21 reorganisation. Indians thus had nothing to do with tanks till 1937-3828 when, keeping in view the growing German military threat and relative backwardness of the Indian Army it was decided to mechanise two Indian cavalry units i.e 13 Lancers and 14 Scinde Horse29. Both were given a squadron each of Vickers Light Tanks and Crossley Armoured Cars, phased out from British units 30 . The reader may note that the main problem in mechanisation of Indian cavalry in the interwar years was not essentially conservatism but lack of funds. Three of the five Indian Army chiefs in the inter war years were from cavalry31 and wanted to mechanise the Indian Cavalry. Their efforts to do so failed because of lack of funds and economic depression of the inter war years.32 Thus on the eve of WW Two in 1939 just two Indian cavalry units were mechanised. The outbreak of World War Two forced the British to speed up mechanisation but initially mechanisation for Indians meant only trucks or armoured cars. There was one important measure which the British undertook and which most probably attracted the best available manpower to try to enrol in the Indian Armoured Corps.This was an almost doubling of the pay of the Armoured Corps soldiers from around 18 rupees to 33 rupees per month.33 This was done in October 1942, once General Martel who was visiting India in order to reorganise the Indian Armoured Corps was told that “India had a mercenary army” and that the best men in India would not join he Indian Armoured Corps if they were paid Rs 18 per month which was the average monthly pay of an Indian soldier.

SECOND WORLD WAR

THE BURMA FRONT

It was Burma where the Indians for the first time thanks to US military aid to Britain were given the latest tanks of World War Two. Both the Indian tank brigades i.e. 254 (which led 33 Corps advance) and 255 (which led 4 Corps advance) were equipped with Grant and Sherman tanks.These brigades however had a limited infantry support role. It cannot be said that the Indians who fought as tankmen learnt anything really worthwhile about modern armoured warfare. The tank warfare conducted in Burma was a one sided show with the British Indian Army having 300 most modern Grant and Sherman tanks34 against just one Japanese Tank Regiment35 consisting of tanks which could not have the firepower or capability to destroy the Grants and Shermans of the Indian tank brigades!36 Mostly they were in support of infantry and the Japanese in front of them had hardly any tanks to match the heavy Shermans etc with which the Indian cavalry regiments were equipped. Thus there were hardly any tank to tank fights since the Japanese hardly possessed anything to oppose the latest Sherman and Grant tanks. The only resistance that these tanks encountered was from Japanese anti tank guns and artillery at very close ranges and these were relatively rare since the British always enjoyed numerical superiority in the later stages of the Burmese campaign and the British Indian infantry was always in close support of their tanks. In war once the enemy is vastly undergunned and underequipped to oppose you, little can be learned in terms of tactical or operational lessons. Brigadier Riaz ul Karim whose unit 5 Horse was equipped with Shermans in Burma has claimed that he was the only Indian who commanded a tank squadron in actual action in Burma and also won an MC. If this is true then the only Pakistani officer who actually commanded a tank squadron (not armoured car or tracked carrier) in WW Two was a sidelined man in the Ayubian era before 1965 war broke out!37 In any case Indian or Pakistani officers could have learnt little about armour tactics in Burma which was essentially an infantry man’s war and in which the enemy was vastly outnumbered both qualitatively as well as quantitatively as far as the tanks were concerned.

NORTH AFRICAN THEATRE

In the North African theatre the Indian armour experience was also quite limited. The Indian 3rd Motor Brigade that reached North Africa in early 1941 was equipped with soft skinned wheeled vehicles and did little except evading getting captured by the tanks of Rommel’s Afrika Korps!38 Even their British masters were so inept in handling of tanks that the Germans inflicted various major defeats on them despite the fact that the British were numerically as well as qualitatively superior to the Germans! In such an environment Indians could have learnt little about armoured warfare. The British tanks in North Africa were famous for doing one of the two things. Either they would recklessly charge a well prepared German or Italian position, without any deliberate support from the despicable artillery, and return with a bloody nose or would exercise extreme caution once restrained by “Take no Risk, do nothing till you enjoy overwhelming numerical superiority” policy of commanders like Ritchie or Montgommery as happened in various operational situations throughout the North African campaign from 1941 to 1943, thus allowing the enemy to counter attack decisively and turn the scales or to disengage and occupy another sound defensive position. In any case the Indians were organised as infantry divisions or as Light Recce elements in motorised brigades and did not have tanks in this sector, which ensured that their experiences were limited as far as true armoured warfare was concerned. The Indian whose battle performance was most distinguished in this sector in tangible terms was Major Rajendarsinhji then a squadron commander of 2nd Gardner’s Horse who was awarded a Distinguished Service Order in 1941 for breaking out and capturing 300 enemy troops as prisoners.39 The South African official historian correctly observed that “.....the armoured car regiments were employed almost exclusively in observation which they performed with commendable efficiency, but there was little else in the desert campaigns that they were equipped to do. The armour of their cars was inadequate, being vulnerable to everything save rifle fire, and their armament a machine gun at best was useless save for shooting up thin skinned and defenceless transport”. 40

OTHER THEATRES

Indian armour was deployed in other theatres like Italy, Sudan Malaya etc but here too their role was scouting and observation rather than anything more significant and the few armour officers who served in these theatres could have learnt very little about real tank battles even at squadron and unit level. The operations in these areas were infantry dominated in any case and in Italy warfare had degenerated to the positional battles of WW One.

POST 1947 DEVELOPMENTS

1947-1965

INITIAL ORGANISATION

Pakistan Army, as a result of the division of the pre 1947 British Indian Army on a communal basis, inherited six armoured regiments at the time of transfer of power and partition of India. These six units were constituted from Muslim manpower of units transferred to Pakistan and those transferred to India as the following two tables indicate 41:—

ORIGINAL CLASS COMPOSITION OF ARMOURED UNITS ALLOTTED TO PAKISTAN
REGIMENT	RANGHAR/RAJPUT MUSLIM (HINDUSTANI MUSLIMS)	PATHAN MUSLIM	PUNJABI MUSLIM	SIKHS	HINDU DOGRAS	HINDU JAT

13 LANCERS	1	1		1
GUIDES		1		1	1
11 CAVALRY	1		1	1
5 HORSE			1	1	1
6 LANCERS			1	1		1
19 LANCERS			1	1		1
TOTAL	2	2	4	6	2	2
18 SQUADRONS

The deficiency of 10 Muslim Squadrons was made up by inter unit transfers from the following units allotted to India:—

REGIMENT	PUNJABI MUSLIMS	HINDUSTANI MUSLIMS (RANGHARS)	KAIMKHANI (MUSLIMS (RAJPUTS)	PATHAN MUSLIMS
17 POONA HORSE			1 (TO 19 LANCERS)
14 SCINDE HORSE		1 (TO 13 LANCERS)		1 (TO GUIDES)
4 HODSON HORSE		1 (TO GUIDES)
2 LANCERS		PARTS TO 11 CAVALRY
9 DECCAN HORSE		SOME MEN TO 11 CAVALRY AND 1 SQUADRON TO 5 HORSE
7 CAVALRY		1 (TO 6 LANCERS)
8 CAVALRY		1 (TO 6 LANCERS)	PARTS TO 11 CAVALRY
1ST SKINNERS HORSE		1 (TO 11 CAVALRY)
18 CAVALRY			1 SQUADRON TO 5 HORSE
CENTRAL INDIA HORSE		1 (TO 19 LANCERS)
TOTAL	5. 5 SQUADRONS	1. 5 SQUADRONS	2 SQUADRONS	1 SQUADRON

The above thus made the class composition of the Pakistan Armoured Corps as following :—

ETHNIC GROUP	PATHAN MUSLIMS-RECRUITED ONLY FROM 1846	PUNJABI MUSLIM RECRUITED ONLY FROM 1846	RAJPUT/HINDUSTANI/KAIMKHANI/RANGHAR MOSTLY FROM UNITS RAISED IN 1804-1846
NUMBER OFSQUADRONS	3	9. 5	5. 5
General Messervy the first Britisher C in C of the Pakistan Army was a cavalryman from 4 Hodson’s Horse/13 Lancers42, along with Gracey as Chief of Staff and his team of Pakistani and British officers had organised the Pakistani General Headquarters at Rawalpindi in the old buildings that had once housed the pre 1947 headquarters of the old Northern Command. By January 1948 Messervy had reorganised the armoured regiments as following43:—
FORMATION	LOCATION	UNIT ALLOTTED	REMARKS
7 DIVISION	HQ AT RAWALPINDI	11 CAVALRY	LIGHT ARMOURED REGIMENT
8 DIVISION	HQ AT KARACHI	NIL	NIL
9 (F) DIVISION	HQ AT PESHAWAR	10 GUIDES CAVALRY	HEAVY ARMOURED REGIMENT
10 DIVISION	HQ AT LAHORE	6 LANCERS	LIGHT ARMOURED REGIMENT
3RD INDEPENDENT	HQ AT RISALPUR	13 LANCERS	MEDIUM ARMOURED REGIMENT
ARMOURED BRIGADE		5 HORSE 19 LANCERS	MEDIUM ARMOURED REGIMENT

EMPLOYMENT OF ARMOUR IN 1947-48 WAR

Although 3rd Armoured Brigade was equipped with Shermans, Pakistani General Headquarters did not employ any Pakistani tanks in the 1947-48 Kashmir War. Mr Jinnah the Governor General wanted to conduct the war aggressively,and had the vision but not the energy . He was a dying man and had too many things to do. Unfortunately he was not supported by his ethnically divided as well highly incompetent and irresolute cabinet of weak men who had neither the vision nor the resolution to function as a war cabinet! The Pakistan Army on the other hand was commanded by a non interested Britisher.

The 11 Cavalry equipped with armoured cars were the only unit employed in the war. The GHQ assigned the unit an essentially defensive and passive role but the indomitable Colonel Tommy Masud commanding the unit was too resolute a man to be restrained 44. The unit thus took a prominent part in operations in Bhimbhar-Mirpur area under Tommy Masud, but its role remained limited since it was not allowed to conduct any major offensive operation to support the militia by an over cautious general headquarters.

The Indians on the other hand employed their armour much more aggressively and imaginatively in Kashmir. Armoured cars of the 7th Light Cavalry saved Srinagar in November 194745. The Indians also employed tanks decisively in recapture of strategic towns like Jhangar and Rajauri of which the latter was captured single-handedly by a tank squadron of Central India Horse46. The greatest Indian strategic success by employment of tanks was the recapture of the otherwise impregnable 11,578 feet high Zojila Pass on 1st November 194847 which enabled them to relieve Leh and recapture the vast bulk of Ladakh. These areas without Zojila Pass were for all purposes lost to the Indians. Today the Pakistan Army is still paying the price for loss of Zojila with approximately three infantry brigades committed in Pakistan held Kashmir opposite Indian held Ladakh.

The rule of the thumb of the 1947-48 War was the fact that all Indian successes had a deep connection with presence of tanks or armoured cars while all Pakistani failures were attributable to the absence of tanks or armoured cars! Indians stopped only where either the gradient became too steep for their tanks or where there were bottlenecks like the Indus or the Jhelum valley and tank or armoured cars could not make an impression.

The Pakistani GHQ finally moved the 3rd Armoured Brigade near Bhimbhar, for a projected counterstroke at Indian communications to Poonch, but was glad and relieved, at not employing it, when the Indians made a unilateral offer of ceasefire on 30 December 1947.48

DEVELOPMENT’S DURING 1948 -1965

The Pakistan Armoured Corps was equipped almost wholly with US tanks. These tanks as earlier discussed were supplied by the US in WW Two for the defence of Burma. The armoured cars were mostly of British origin but had proved obsolete even in WW Two and were slowly phased out in the period 1950-58 as US aid enabled the armoured corps to wholly switch to tanks from 1954 onwards. It appears that the policy makers in the Pakistan Army in 1954 did not really appreciate the importance of tanks. The first US military team, which came to Pakistan and surveyed the Pakistani military requirement ments after liaison and discussions with Pakistani officers thus, reported to the US Joint Chiefs Committee that the Pakistan Army needed equipment for one armoured brigade and four infantry divisions. The US Joint Chiefs added another armoured division to this estimate making the proposed four and half division plan the famous “Five and Half Divisions Plan”49.

The developments and changes that took place in Pakistani armour can be gauged from the following table:—

PERIOD	CUMULATIVE NUMBER OF ARMOURED REGIMENTS	REMARKS
1947-48	6	13 Lancers,10 Cavalry,11 Cavalry,19 Lancers, 6 Lancers,5 Horse
1949-1955	8	15 Lancers and 12 Cavalry raised in 1955.
1956-1962	14	4, 22,23,24 ,25 Cavalry and 20 Lancers.
1962-1965	18	30,31,32 and 33 TDU.

1947-1956	1956-1965	REMARKS
3RD INDEPENDENT ARMOURED BRIGADE	1ST ARMOURED DIVISION COMPRISING	1ST ARMOURED DIVISON RAISED IN 1956
	3 AND 4 ARMOURED BRIGADES.	AS PART OF 5 AND HALF DIVISION PLAN.
	5 ARMOURED BRIGADE ADDED LATER	THE DIVISON WAS ADDED ON INITIATIVE OF US JCS.
THREE DIVISIONAL TANK REGIMENTS	100 ARMOURED BRIGADE CODE NAME OF 6 ARMOURED DIVISION RAISED SHORTLY BEFORE THE WAR	RAISED FOR DEFENCE OF AREA NORTH OF RAVI SINCE 1ST ARMOURED DIVISION WAS GIVEN A ROLE SOUTH OF RAVI.
	DIVISIONAL TANK REGIMENTS AND ONE CORPS RECCE REGT	12 CAVALRY, 15 AND 20 LANCERS RECCE REGIMENTS.
100 ARMOURED BRIGADE/ LATER 6 ARMOURED DIVISION	IN EXISTENCE SINCE THE FIFTIES BUT REDESIGNATED AS THE 6 ARMOURED DIVISION IN 1965	UNITS LOCATED IN THE FIFTIES ATNOWSHERA, PESHAWAR, MANSAR ETC BUT FINALLY LOCATED AT KHARIAN BEFORE THE 1965 WAR.
	FOUR TANK DELIVERY REGIMENTS RAISED IN 1965 TO AUGMENT ARMOUR RESOURCES OF INFANTRY DIVISIONS	TWO WITH FIFTEEN DIVISION IN SIALKOT-SHAKARGARH BULGE AND ONE EACH WITH 10 AND 11 DIVISION IN RAVI-SUTLEJ CORRIDOR.

We have seen that the Pakistani armoured division was a gift of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff since the US Military advisory group had recommended a four and half division plan, which included, only one armoured brigade. There is little doubt that in the hearts of their hearts the senior Pakistani lot, with men like Musa, described by Gul as selected for “dependability rather than merit “50 feared employing this division, in actual operations, more than the Indians! The problem with the army of that time, was not as Gul suggests, that it was infantry dominated. This as a matter of fact is the case with all armies, since infantry is the largest arm and thus has the maximum number of officers. The problem was that historically, by virtue of conservative British traditions and the colonial legacy, there were very few officers, armour or non armour, who really understood tank warfare beyond squadron level. Whatever the reason, the only major armoured divisional training manoeuvre with troops, as per General Gul, held before the 1965 war was one in 196151 (Gul has probably got the year wrong since both Musa and A.R Siddiqi cite 1960) as to test the 1 Armoured Division and this as per Gul’s description was a Quixotic episode.52 The exercise was nicknamed “Tezgam” and according to both Gul and A.R Siddiqi was an utter fiasco,53 in the sense that despite ample, warning time the armoured division being exercised did no reconnaissance and tanks were launched in boggy country as a result of which a very large part of the armoured division got bogged down.54 The reader may note that “Exercise Tezgam” was no haphazard affair, having been planned in advance and mentioned by Fazal Muqeem as one which “will be held”55 at the time of writing his book on the army.

The only positive aspect of this exercise not mentioned by Gul was reduction of the size of an armoured regiment from 75 to 44 Tanks56. This was a positive improvement since an armoured regiment with 75 Tank was an administrative nightmare and difficult to tactically control. The tanks rendered surplus were used to raise four more armoured regiments which were allotted to the infantry divisions and certainly improved their battle potential. As a result four more armoured regiments (22,23,24 & 25 Cavalry) were raised in 1962.57

During the period 1954-65 various Pakistani armour officers were sent to attend courses at the US Armour School Fort Knox . These courses however played limited role in the development of the Pakistanis since the US way of warfare was lavish and totally different from that of the Indo Pak scenario in terms of terrain, comparative level of infantry mobility etc. However, some officers who were assigned to revise tank manuals did employ US manuals apart from British tank manuals to good use as this scribe discovered while serving in the Tactical Wing of the School of Armour in the period 1990-91! 58

Again during the same period professionalism in tank regiments varied from unit to unit. There was the case of a unit that painted the muzzle ends of the barrel of its main gun where cuttings are made to bore sight the guns and, would have been not very effective, had it been employed in the 1965 war! There were cases of newly raised units led by some excellent officers like the 25 Cavalry. Thus on one side there were units who were as as non professional as British cavalry who were notoriously incompetent in fame for lopping off their own horses heads59 instead of the enemy’s, because of poor cavalry swordmanship standards. On the other hand there were units where professional efficiency was higher due to force of tradition or by virtue of having excellent commanding officers. In this regard the British system of each tank regiment having its own idiosyncrasies worked mostly in a negative manner! As I discovered much later that each tank regiment was as distinct from another as one Hindu caste from another and this was even in terms of training, operating procedures etc! The point is that the transformation from cavalry to mechanisation was thus not fully incorporated neither in the British Army nor in the British Indian Army, and the Indian tank experience against the hopelessly undergunned and ill equipped Japanese tanks in Burma in WW Two also was not helpful in developing levels of professional competence necessary in mechanised units.

The period 1951-1965 i.e the Ayubian era, was a period when one man dominated the army and as history has proved, dictators prefer working with men they know, and can trust. This was not helpful for the tank corps since the ruling clique was infantry dominated. I am not hinting that armour as an arm suffered Vis a Vis infantry as Gul’s memoirs imply. Nor I am suggesting that there were no potential Guderians or Von Thomas. The point that is being driven home is, that the emphasis was on thrusting men on the armoured division who were not very imaginative or professional, but were essentially , loyal and dependable men. The same was true for infantry too, but armour despite being a highly specialised arm was treated as no different from infantry. In the process some relatively gifted armour officers without good family connections and without having the advantage of belonging to the ruling cliques regimental groups were sidelined. War record for promotion to higher ranks was no criteria at that time as has remained the case till to date, since its Godfather had the most dubious war record in the Indian Army of WW Two!

The Pakistan Armoured Corps thus remained a ceremonial but much neglected arm during the period 1951-65. No serious thought was given to developing a special Indo Pak doctrine of employment of the armoured division in the framework of a corps. The emphasis in the Ayubian army was on the “New Concept of Defence” which revolved around the infantry division and as per one general officer of that time “did not last even for the first day of 1965 War”!60 The ideas of the senior officers of that time about armour were vague but it was generally thought that Pakistani armour would perform roles similar to those of the German armour of 1940! The concept of friction and the independent will of the enemy was not really understood by these men who were of the firm conviction that by virtue of having martial races and better US tanks, it would not be very difficult to teach the Indians a good lesson in case of war! It was fashionable to read or pose to read “Rommel Papers”61 and Liddell Hart’s “Strategy the Indirect Approach” 62 but no serious attempt was made in the armoured corps ,as the tank manuals and journals of that time amply prove, to understand the real mechanics of tank warfare or the essence of Blitzkrieg.

Even at the armoured brigade level no credible doctrine/tactics of the armoured battle at brigade level was developed . Each unit jealously guarded its traditions and remained a closed entity for other armoured units even within the same brigade. The armoured brigade commanders developed a similar to infantry brigade commanders with fixed field headquarters with reliance on despatch riders and liaison officers whereas mobile operations demanded that the armoured brigade commander stayed close to the leading regiment while his staff looked after the brigade headquarters.

The emphasis thus remained on the thinking that each unit must increase its battle honours while training at brigade and divisional level was neglected. Gul states that many of the armour commanders who performed miserably in 1965 were never tested in peacetime training. Thus while commenting on the pathetic handling of armour in Khem Karan in 1965 Gul said “It seems (commenting on Khem Karan operations) that the two Headquarters (11 Division and 1st Armoured Division) were paralysed by the very dimension of their undertaking........Had they physically handled their commands on manoeuvres in more normal times,they would have been either found out, and should have been sacked, or the enormity of the task that confronted them later in the war would not have benumbed them”.63

On the eve of 1965 war the Pakistan Armoured Corps was organised as following64:—

1 ARMOURED DIVISION	6 ARMOURED DIVISION	RECCE REGIMENTS	INFANTRY DIVISIONAL TANK REGIMENTS	INFANTRY DIVISIONALTDU REGIMENTS
6 LANCERS	10 GUIDES CAVALRY	15 LANCERS (WITH 11 DIV)	23 CAVALRY (WITH 10 DIV)	30 TDU ( WITH 10 DIV) 31 TDU ( WITH 15 DIV)
19 LANCERS	11 CAVALRY	20 LANCERS (WITH 15 DIV)	25 CAVALRY (WITH 15 DIV)
5 HORSE	22 CAVALRY		13 LANCERS (7 DIV)	32 TDU (WITH 11 DIV)
12 CAVALRY(RECCE REGT)				33 TDU (WITH 15 DIV)
4 CAVALRY
24 CAVALRY

EMPLOYMENT IN 1965 WAR OPERATION GRAND SLAM

Operation Grand Slam i.e the plan to capture Akhnur via a major divisional level attack supported by two armoured regiments was the first major tank battle of Pakistan Armoured Corps. Chamb had always been a sensitive area since 1947 and in 1948 war the Indians had taken special care to station tanks here . However, in 1965 due to some phenomenally incompetent thinking at the higher level the Indians ignored this important sector and wishfully believed that the main Pakistani attack in the area will come in Jhangar area. As a matter of fact as early as 1955-56 the Indian 80 Brigade commander had appreciated the importance of Chamb-Jaurian-Akhnur area and had identified it as a weak area65 which needed to be defended in greater strength. In 1956 an Indian Corps exercise setting was based on the scenario that Pakistanis had captured Akhnur66. The Indian High Command was as naive as the Pakistani GHQ in thinking that the Pakistanis will “not cross the international border (in Chamb area) because that would constitute an attack on India67”, thus in words of Gurcharan the southern half of the Chamb border (opposite the internationally recognised border) was rendered “sacrosanct”68. Chamb was held by a lone infantry brigade and was reinforced by a tank squadron of AMX-13 Light Tanks only in August 1965 69.

Pakistani armour enjoyed a marked qualitative and quantitative superiority over Indian armour in this operation. There were two Pakistani Patton regiments against one Indian light tank squadron in the battle . The single Indian AMX-13 squadron defending the area possessed relatively effective firepower (in terms of armour penetration) but was far inferior to the five Pakistani Patton squadrons in terms of protection (armour thickness) and was further dispersed since its area of responsibility was more than even that of one tank regiment. Thus while too wide an area of responsibility nullified the chances of its concentrated employment, poor armour protection gravely increased its vulnerability and seriously reduced its ability to manoeuvre or even jockey. The principal Indian advantage was bad terrain which enabled their anti tank guns (recoilless rifles) to engage Pakistani armour. However, this was balanced by surprise since the Indians were not expecting an armoured brigade size force in the sector.

Regardless of all rhetoric about Grand Slam’s brilliance, armour was under-utilised and poorly employed. The vast numerical advantage of six to one in armour, was partially nullified by dividing the two tank regiments between two brigades who in turn dished out each tank squadron to one infantry battalion. Thus instead of using the armour as a punch it was used like a thin net, as a result of which its hitting power was vastly reduced while the Indians were able to engage tank squadrons made to charge them in a piecemeal manner! Thus while the Pakistani victory, thanks to tank numerical and qualitative superiority was a foregone conclusion, the cost in terms of equipment and loss of manpower was too high as the table included in the footnotes indicates.

Thus Shaukat Riza despite being granted limited autonomy to use his independent mind was forced to very tactfully admit while only citing the artillery aspect, that the attack plan lacked concentration. Shaukat thus wrote, “ The guns had to be distributed to support attacking troops on a front of 30,000 yards. The Indians had only covering troops on the border outposts. The distribution of our artillery fire enabled them to delay our crossing of Munawar Tawi on 1st September”.70

Later events have led to some oversights in analysing “Operation Grand Slam” and writers have only talked about the change of command of the division which led to a literal “suspension of action” of full 24 hours in the division’s advance. The first serious failure, however occurred on the first day of attack i.e 1st September due to faulty execution and lack of understanding of the key operational concept within 12 Division at brigade level. It was as a result of this misunderstanding that 12 Division failed to cross Tawi the first day despite the fact that it had reached it opposite Chamb at 0830 or 0855 hours on the morning of 1st September 1971.71 The Pakistani failure in crossing Tawi on the first day and securing Pallanwalla thereby throwing the Indians off balance can be squarely ascribed to poor execution of plans at brigade level and divisional level. Brigadier A.A.K Chaudhry states in his book that the unnecessary delay occurred since the infantry brigade commander insisted on capture of Burjeal despite the fact that Gen Akhtar Hussain Malik had categorically ordered him to bypass it .72 This serious lapse led to delay of one day in crossing of Tawi and enabled the Indians to conduct an orderly withdrawal across Tawi during night 1st/2nd September 1965. Thus the Indians were pushed back but not routed which was within 12 Divisions capability had the infantry brigade commander not got obsessed with Burjeal .

The beauty of the Grand Slam plan i.e the fact that the Pakistani Commander had the benefit of overwhelming numerical superiority of 6 to 1 in armour and the additional advantage of having no natural obstacle between the start line and Akhnur was thus lost on the very first day .Speed was the essence of the issue since the frontage of advance became narrower as the attackers advanced eastwards with the river Chenab closing in from the south, and the high mountains closing in from the north making the defenders task easier and the attackers task more difficult.

By 2050 Hours 1st September 191 Brigade defending Chamb started withdrawal towards Chamb while the 41 Mountain Brigade was ordered to occupy the Troti-Jaurian intermediate position. The Pakistani position despite all these imperial blunders was formidable when change of command was ordered and the Indians got another 24 hours to prepare their intermediate defence position at Troti-Jaurian. From 3rd September onwards progress of operations became slower although qualitative advantage in tanks enabled the Pakistanis to capture Jaurian , surprise was lost and the Indians were able to reinforce the sector with a third infantry brigade and a third AMX squadron. Surprise was lost and armour’s freedom of manoeuvre became more and more limited as the total available frontage of advance became reduced by one sixth due to Chenab in the south and the mountains in the north.

This is not the proper place to go into further details, which are the subject of an article, devoted entirely to Grand Slam in a future issue.

The Indian anti tank rifles caused maximum armour casualties on the first day of the battle. These were entirely avoidable had the bulk of the armour been concentrated and tasked to straight go for Pallanwalla rather than distributing it till battalion level. The real hero of the first day of Grand Slam was the rank and files both infantry and armour on both sides. The Indians were saved from total riot by the sheer grit and determination of their anti tank gunners and the most vulnerable AMX crews while Pakistanis lost their chance to rout the enemy because of inability to concentrate and obsession with Burjeal.

BATTLE OF CHAWINDA

The tank battles fought between Chawinda and Charwa from the 8th to 16th September are fit to be made subject of a Shakespearean comedy of errors. The Indian armour, at brigade level and divisional level, was handled in a highly incompetent and irresolute manner on 8th September ,despite the fact that both the commanders were from the armoured corps! The Indians enjoyed a five to one superiority, but unlike Grand Slam it was in number of tank regiments rather than number of tank squadrons , which makes the superiority thrice as much effective!

Pakistan was saved by sheer coup d oeil by one man i.e Lieutenant Colonel Nisar of 25 Cavalry who in the classic Clausewitzian description was guided by a spark of purpose and a ray of hope in an intensely obscure situation at a time when no Pakistani headquarter, brigade, divisional or corps was aware, and I would say with conviction, thankfully so, of the exact operational situation. The Indians fought as bravely as the Pakistanis till tank regiment level but their rot started from brigade and division downwards! Nisar deployed two of his squadrons between Gadgor and Degh Nala in an extended line and his regiment engaged the Indians in such a terrific manner that the Indians in words of their tank corps historian lost more tanks that day than were held in total by 25 Cavalry opposing them and were blocked by just two tank squadrons!73 These are words of praise from the enemy, for a man who was promoted to the rank of brigadier with great difficulty and was dumped later, while many far more incompetent and clerk type men rose to much higher ranks after both 1965 and 1971!

Nisar and his regiment, some of whom are now bent upon taking the whole credit while portraying Nisar as an innocent bystander at best, imposed such a caution by their 8th September stand that the Indians withdrew their entire tank division and sank into total suspension of action from 8th to 11th September. The Pakistanis thus got three valuable days to bring up more tank regiments and the battles from 11th to 16th September were fought under conditions which commenced with near parity in tanks and soon transformed by 16th September into superiority in tanks in favour of Pakistanis . The fact that Indians enjoyed superiority in infantry was largely irrelevant since Pakistani tanks had limited their space for manoeuvre and the Indian infantry superiority could have been effective in only a post breakout phase. But breakout after 12th September was not possible since Pakistan’s 1st Armoured Division had reinforced the Pakistani position.

BATTLE OF KHEM KARAN VALTOHA

Battle of Khem Karan-Valtoha proved that although politically Pakistan and India were two nations, intellectually both were one nation composed of highly incompetent men beyond colonel level. Here Pakistani armour enjoyed a seven to one superiority in tanks in terms of total troops available but were unable to pump their armour inside the enemy territory in time thus enabling the Indians to recover from surprise from 8th September onwards. The Indians were initially so demoralised that their infantry division commander requested to be relieved by another division.74

Pakistan’s 5th Armoured Brigade could have outflanked the Indian 4th Mountain Division on the 7th and 8th of September had it concentrated its tank strength and developed the battle from one direction. Instead one tank regiment was sent towards the right while one was sent towards the left and centre, thus reducing the potential superiority to near parity. All gains made by armour during the daytime were squandered since the armoured brigade commander insisted that all tanks be parked in front of his brigade headquarter after last light! This as a matter of fact was a British tradition 75 but even the rationale why the British did so mostly in North Africa was not applicable in the Indo-Pak scenario. (See Analysis for further elaboration). By 10th September the Indians had reinforced the sector and although they were outnumbered in tanks by five to two till the end, bad terrain and inability of the Pakistani armour to breakout of the bottle neck between Nikasu Nala and Rohi Nala while the Indians were demoralised in vastly outnumbered in number of total available tanks from 6th to 8th September led to a stagnation and stalemate by 11th September. Thus all the advantages of initial surprise and superiority in numbers were nullified due to poor staff work, poor initial planning, faulty execution as a result of which numerical superiority was not fully realised due to poor terrain and lack of freedom of manoeuvre.

BATTLE OF LAHORE

The role of armour in the battle for Lahore was limited . Indian armour was divided down to squadron level and played a negligible role on 6th and 7th September. In any case their Shermans were no match to Pakistan’s Pattons of which the 23 Cavalry held two squadrons.

The Pakistani tank/infantry counterattack on 8th September however produced a crisis of operational level in the 15 Indian Division. On 8th September as a result of Pakistani armour/infantry counterattack an Indian infantry brigade became so demoralised that two of its units simply abandoned their defences and bolted away, leading to a situation where the Indians had to reinforce it with a fresh infantry brigade76, however certainly did cause an operational crisis in the 15 Indian Division on 8th September thereby seriously weakening the Indian resolve to capture Lahore. The Indian armoured corps historian did not take a similar view77, however as cited earlier this fact is well attested in the “War Despatches” of General Harbaksh Singh. Absence of Pakistani tanks at Dograi due to poor map reading and confusion in orders78 however played a major part in Indian recapture of Dograi on 21/22 September 1965. In short, tanks played a relatively significant but limited role in the battle of Lahore since the BRB strictly limited their mobility.

INTER WAR YEARS-1965-1971
The following table illustrates the inter war changes in the armoured corps:—
EXISTING REGIMENTS TILL 1965	REGIMENTS RAISED FROM 1965 TILL DECEMBER 1971	REMARKS
13 Lancers,10 Guides Cavalry,	26 Cavalry, 27 Cavalry,	30,31,32 & 33 TDU were redesignated as cavalry regiments after the 1965 War . 29 Cavalry was stationed in East Pakistan.Some ad hoc squadrons were also raised one of which later became 39 Cavalry and one i.e 5 Independent Squadron survived the reorganisation after the war by becoming training squadron of School of Armour.
11 Cavalry, 6 Lancers.5 Horse,	28 Cavalry, 29 Cavalry,
19 Lancers, 12 Cavalry,15 Lancers,	38 Cavalry,51 Lancers.
4 Cavalry ,20 Lancers, 22 Cavalry,
23 Cavalry,24 Cavalry, 25 Cavalry,
30 TDU,31 TDU,32 TDU,33 TDU.
EXISTING HEADQUARTERS IN 1965	HEADQUARTERS RAISEDFROM 1965 TO 1971
1ST Armoured Division	2nd Armoured Brigade	2nd and 8th Independent Brigade HQ were raised in 2nd Half of 1970.8th Armoured Brigade was corps reserve of 1 Corps while 2nd Armoured Brigade was under command 23 Division in the war. 3rd Armoured Brigade was directly under HQ 4 Corps in Ravi-Sutlej Corridor.7th and 9th Armoured Brigades were part of 6th Armoured Division and 4th and 5th Armoured Brigades were part of 1st Armoured Division.
6th Armoured Division	7th Armoured Brigade
3rd Armoured Brigade	8th Armoured Brigade
4th Armoured Brigade	9th Armoured Brigade
5th Armoured Brigade

REFERENCES AND ENDNOTES

Introductory Note:— Many details may not be accurate since the author does not have access to historical records. The author welcomes any positive suggestions/corrections/pointing out of any factual errors. The author welcomes any battle account from any veteran of WW Two pertaining to combat administrative or other issues like man management relations between officers and ranks etc. Any account received by the author will be sent to the Imperial War Museum and some other universities where military historians of international repute can make use of them .This is important, author feels that in few years time all valuable records will be destroyed in case no effort is made to preserve them; since the major interest in Pakistan and India seems to be in other non military pursuits. Maps which have been conceived and drawn by the author in free hand are based either on Survey of Pakistan maps or on Map Number TPC G-7D, Scale 1:500,000 , as far as Chamb-Jaurian area is concerned, prepared under the direction of the Defence Intelligence Agency and published by the Aeronautical Chart and Information Centre.US Airforce, St Louis ,Missouri-63118. Compiled from maps and intelligence information available as of November 1967. These maps are available to public on nominal payment and are used by civilian pilots.

1 Page- 14- Pakistan Army Till 1965- Major A.H Amin-Strategicus & Tacticus- 17 Aug 1999-P.O Box 13146- Arlington- VA-22219-U.SA

2 Page-326-Ibid and Page-122- Cambridge History of India-Volume Five-British India-1497-1858 -H.H Dodwell-Reprinted by S.Chand and Company-New Delhi- 1987.

3 Page-451- A Sketch of the Services of the Bengal Army- Lieut F.G Cardew-Revised and Edited in the Military Department of the Government of India- Office of the Superintendent of Government Printing-Calcutta-1903.

4 Page-140-A Matter of Honour - Philip Mason- Jonathan Cape-London-1974.

5 Page- 141-Ibid and Pages-109 & 110 -So they Rode and Fought - Major General Syed Shahid Hamid (Retired)- Midas Books- Kent-UK-1983. Two native cavalry regiments were raised by the Nawab of Oudh on the Company’s orders in 1776 (Refers-Page-451-Lieut F.G Cardew-Op Cit) under British officers and transferred to the English East India Company’s service in 1777 and designated as 1st and 2nd Bengal Native Cavalry. (Refers-Page-110-Shahid Hamid-Op Cit ) .Similarly 16 Light Cavalry the oldest surviving Indian Cavalry unit was raised in Carnatic by the Nawab of Arcot for service with the Madras Army. It was taken over permanently by the East India Company in 1784 and became the 3rd Regiment of Madras Native Cavalry (Refers-Page-147-Ibid ).

6 Page-159 and 160- A Concise Dictionary of Military Biography - Martin Window and Francis. K . Mason-Osprey Publishing Limited-Berkshire -GB-1975. Page-79-Lieut F.G Cardew-Op Cit.

7 Page-76-Lieut F.G Cardew-Op Cit and Page- 23-Maj Gen Shahid Hamid-Op Cit.

8 Page-470-Lieut F.G Cardew-Op Cit and Page- 532 -Fidelity and Honour- Lieut Gen S.L Menezes-Penguin Books -India-Delhi-1993. There were three armies but the C in C Bengal Army was also overall C in C India although the other two C in Cs of Bombay and Madras Armies enjoyed a very large measure of autonomy bordering on virtual independence of command. Initially however the Madras military establishment was seniormost (Refers -Page-327-Chapter Eleven- Imperial Gazetteer of India-Volume Four-Administrative - Based on material supplied by Lieut Gen Sir Edward Collen-Published under the authority of His Majesty’s Secretary of State for India in Council at the Clarendon Press-Oxford-1907) but by 1758 following Clive’s great victory at Plassey Bengal became the seniormost and supreme military establishment. Lord Clive , then Colonel Robert Clive was the first C in C of the Bengal Army from December 1756 and 25 February 1760 while also holding the charge of the Governor of Bengal (Refers-Page- 470-Lieut F.G Cardew-Op Cit). Bengal had been a “ Presidency “ English East India Company since 1699. (Refers-Page-3 -Lieut F.G Cardew-Op Cit).

9 Page-23-Lieut F.G Cardew-Op Cit. As per William Irvine in the Mughal Army the cavalry was largely composed of respectable Mohameddans and Rajputs (Refers-Page-162- The Army of the Indian Moghuls- William Irvine-London-1903 . See also A History of the British Cavalry-1816-1919-Volume Two -The Marquess of Anglesey-London-1975.

10 Page-167-William Irvine-Op Cit and Pages-84 & 85- The New Cambridge History of India-Volume-II.1-Indian Society and the making of the Indian Empire-C.A Bayly-Cambridge University Press-1988.

11 Page-5-Lieut F.G Cardew-Op Cit and Page- 328-Imperial Gazetteer -Op Cit . Many Hindustani Pathans of Shinwari Yusufzai Sherwani and Bangash ancestry from this scribes maternal grandfather Sultan Khan’s family village Sikandara Rao in Aligarh District, (which has the notoriety of remaining loyal to the English East India Company albeit for pragmatic reasons as done by the Punjabis in 1857), served in the cavalry of the Nawabs of Oudh Farrukhabad , the Raja Scindia of Gwalior and the East India Company’s Bengal Army. The village did produce at least one general, (who was a noted member of the Riding Club of Aligarh Muslim University ), who served with distinction in Pakistan Armoured Corps. There were countless such villages from Hissar in the West till Allahabad in the east of Hindustani Pathan Muslims who supplied recruits to the cavalry units of the Marathas , the Nawabs of Oudh and the English East India Company’s armies.

12 Page-243- Britain and Her Army- Correlli Barnett- Penguin Books-London-1974.

13 Page-141-Philip Mason-Op Cit.

14 Page-169-The Battle Book- Bryan Perrett- Arms and Armour-London-1996.

15 Pages-82 to 90-Lieut F.G Cardew-Op Cit.

16 Page-33- The Maratha and the Pindari War” - Lieutenant Colonel R.G Burton - Compiled for the General Staff - India -Government Monotype Press, Simla - 1910.

17 See Class Composition tables on Pages-329 & 405-Lieut F.G Cardew-Op Cit.The Muslims dominated all ten regular units of the Bengal Army which rebelled or were disbanded in 1857. (See History of British Cavalry-Op Cit).The following table taken from Page- 45-Pakistan Army Till 1965-Op Cit.Calculated by the author from details given in the appendix of the Royal Commission on the reorganisation of the Indian Army-London-1858, shows the Muslim preponderance in cavalry right till 1857:-

ARMY TOTAL MUSLIM MUSLIM TOTAL MUSLIM TOTAL MUSLIM

STRENGTH TROOPS % age INFANTRY TROOPS CAVALRY TROOPS

MADRAS 45,341 17,880 39.43 % 45,725 OR 52 15,856 2,616 OR 7 2,024

ARMY REGIMENTS REGIMENTS

BOMBAY 26,894 2,630 5.8 % 25,433 OR 29 2,159 1,461 OR 3 471

ARMY REGIMENTS REGIMENTS

18 Pages-44, 46, 47 & 48- The Indian Army and the King’s Enemies-1900-1947- Charles Chenevix Trench-Thames and Hudson-London -1988.

19 Page-49-C.C Trench-Op Cit. The reader may note that the newly formed Royal Tank Corps did win four Victoria Crosses (Refers-Pages-22 & 23- Tank Commanders- George Forty-Firebird Books-Dorset-UK-1993) in WW One from 1917 till armistice and played a decisive role in the defeat of Germany.

20 Page-213- A Concise History of World War One- Brig Gen Vincent . J.Esposito-Pall Mall Press- London -1965.

21 Pages-91 to 99-C.C Trench-Op Cit.Pages-432 to 440-History of the First World War- B.H Liddell Hart-Pan Books-London-1972.

22 Page-941 & 942- Brassey’s Encyclopaedia of Military History and Biography- Edited by Col Franklin.D.Margotta-Brasseys-Washington-1994. Page-73- A Dictionary of Battles- David Eggenberger- George Allen and Unwin-London-1967.

23 Page-38-George Forty-Op Cit.

24 Page-102-Brig Esposito-Op Cit. Liddell Hart insists in his book that there were several German batteries who did it , however Liddell Hart is a Britisher and a tank enthusiast , I have not relied on his judgement since both national feeling and personal likes may have influenced his judgement in this case. The legend went that one German artillery officer knocked out sixteen tanks although Liddell Hart insists that only five tanks were knocked out. (Refers-Page-344-Liddell Hart-Op Cit).

25 Page-18-Eggenberger-Op Cit.

26 Page-22- George Forty-Op Cit.

27 Page-55-Shahid Hamid-Op Cit.

28 Page-135-C.C Trench and Page-56-Shahid Hamid-Op Cit.

29 Report of Auchinleck Modernisation Sub Committee -Ministry of Defence-Historical Section-New Delhi-1938.

30 Page-135 - C.C Trench -Op Cit.

31 Page-135-Ibid and Pages-534 & 535-Lieut Gen S.L Menezes-Op Cit.

32 Page-135 & 137-C.C Trench-Op Cit.

33 Pages-187 & 188- Our Armoured Forces- Lieutenant General G.L.Q Martel-Faber and Faber-London-1949.

34 Pages-277 & 278-C.C Trench-Op Cit.

35 Page-3 & 4-Campaign of the 14th Army in Burma-Compiled by 14th Army Headquarter-1945-Printed in Government Printing Press-Calcutta.Presented by Field Marshal Sir William Slim, Chief of the Imperial General Staff for use by the Pakistani Armed Forces. General Francis Tucker a veteran of WW Two admitted that the Japanese in Burma were “weak in armour and motor transport”. (Refers-Page-73-The Pattern of War- Lieutenant General Sir Francis Tucker-Cassell and Company Limited-London-1948.

36For the relative inferiority of the Japanese tanks see-Pages-240 to 251- Hand Book on Japanese Military Forces-US War Department-Technical Manual-TM-E-30-480 -1October 1944-United States Government Printing Office-Washington-1944-Reprinted by Louisiana State University Press-Baton Rouge-1995. Slim does not tell us anything about the overwhelming British tank superiority in his otherwise excellent book Defeat into Victory.Neither does General Gul Hassan who was then serving as an ADC and was to later lament about the anti armour bias in the Post 1947 Pakistan Army.

37Page-9- Article-Higher Conduct of 1965 War-Brigadier Riaz Ul Karim Khan, LOM, MC-Defence Journal-Volume Ten-Number-1-2-1984-Karachi. Riaz ul Karim was Director Armoured Corps in the General Headquarters once the 1965 broke out . Director Armoured Corps at that time or even now a post occupied by those in the run! This claim made by Riaz ul Karim may or may not be wholly accurate.The author welcomes any gentleman who is better informed and can point out any factual errors so that these can be incorporated for the sake of historical accuracy.

38 Some Indian cavalry units did have tanks at time like the Central India Horse ( Refers-Page-317-The Sidi Rezegh Battles-1941- J.A.I Agar Hamilton and L.C.F Turner-Oxford University Press-Cape Town-1957

39 Page-483-Rajendarsinhji later the Indian C in C was a remarkable man in many ways .He was offered to be the first Indian C in C but refused voluntarily stating that the decision should be taken on the basis of seniority as a result of which Cariappa became the first Indian C in C of the Indian Army (Refers-Page-448-Lieut Gen S.L Menezes-Op Cit) .Rajendarsinhji was also the first Indian to command an armoured regiment, although in a peacetime location from November 1943 to May 1945 (Refers-Page-557-The Indian Armour-1941-1971- Major General Gurcharan Singh Sandhu-Vision Books -Delhi-1990).

40Page-432-J.A.I Agar Hamilton-Op Cit.

41Pages-190 to 194- The Pakistan Army-1947-1949- Major General Shaukat Riza-Wajid Alis (Private Limited) -Lahore-Printed for Services Book Club-1989.Pages-59 to 105-Sons of John Company-John Gaylor-First Published in UK by Spellmount-1992-Reprint-Lancer International-New Delhi-1993.Pages-559 to 561-The Indian Armour-1941-1971-Op Cit. This table may not be wholly accurate.The author welcomes any gentleman who is better informed and can point out any factual errors so that these can be incorporated for the sake of historical accuracy. The reader may note that the second table may also not be wholly accurate . The author welcomes any gentleman who is better informed and can point out any factual errors so that these can be incorporated for the sake of historical accuracy.

42 Page-153-Shaukat Riza-Op Cit.

43 Pages-178 to 187-Shauakat Riza-Op Cit. This table may not be wholly accurate.The author welcomes any gentleman who is better informed and can point out any factual errors so that these can be incorporated for the sake of historical accuracy. Facts in the column “Remarks” are based on Annexure-”A”-Page -307-Ibid.

44 He lacked the qualities of slavishness or diplomacy to become a general officer in the Ayubian army ! This explains why he did not go beyond a brigadier! Tommy Masud who was a very famous figure in Lahore Gymkhana finally settled in Lahore where he died in the late 1990s. The unit conducted very aggressive actions under his able leadership , one of the proofs of which i.e two captured Indian Armoured cars of the 7th Light Cavalry still adorn the front of the unit quarter guard . Till 1983 when this scribe joined the unit Tommy Masud was remembered with great respect and admiration by many reservists and old timers both from the officers and the rank and file who were attached with or visited the unit .

45 Pages-275 to 277-The Indian Armour-Op Cit.

46 Pages-284 to 286-Ibid.

47 Page- 295-Ibid.

48 Pages-296 & 296-Shauakat Riza-Op Cit.

49 Refers-Pakistan MDA Programme- Memorandum for the Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Arthur Radford by the Special Assistant to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for MDAP Affairs Major General Robert.M.Cannon dated 23 November 1955. Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff-Washington D.C.

50Page-134-Memoirs of General Gul Hassan Khan-Lieutenant General Gul Hassan Khan-Oxford University Press-Karachi-1993)

51Page-24-My Version-Indo Pakistan War 1965-General Musa Khan-Wajid Alis Limited-Lahore-1983.and Page-66- The Military in Pakistan-Image and Reality- Brig A.R Siddiqi-Vanguard Books-Lahore-1996.Gul Hassan cites 1961 (Page-142-Gul Hassan Khan-Op Cit) as the year but both Brig A.R Siddiqi and Musa cite 1960

52 Page-142-Gul Hassan Khan-Op Cit.

53 Page-142-Ibid and Page-66-Brig A.R Siddiqi-Op Cit.

54 Ibid.

55 Page-143-The Story of the Pakistan Army-Major General Fazal Muqeem Khan-Oxford University Press-Lahore -1963

56 Page-25-Musa-Khan-Op Cit. Brigadier Zaheer Alam Khan states that these changes in the organisation of the armoured regiment took place after “Exercise Milestone” held in 1962 (Refers-Page-126-The Way It Was- Brigadier Z.A Khan-Dynavis Private Limited-Pathfinder Fountain-Karachi-1998) and that these were taken on the initiative of Brigadier Bashir , the then Director Armoured Corps. Gul is unfortunately no longer alive to correct us but in all probability it appears that the changes in tank regiment organisation were initiated based on Exercise Tezgam held in 1960 as per Musa and Siddiqi or in 1961 as per Gul Hassan. As per Gen Mitha “Exercise Milestone” in 1961 in addition to the armoured division exercise (i.e Exercise Tezgam) was held to test the “New Concept of Defence” and 10 Division Plus took part in it. (Refers-Page-33-Fallacies and Realities-An Analysis of Gul Hassan’s “Memoirs”-Major General Aboobakar Osman Qasim Mitha-Maktaba Fikr O Danish-Lahore-1994.

57 Page-117-Brig Z.A Khan-Op Cit.

58 Comparison of Tank Platoon and Tank Company-FM-17-32 -Department of the Army-Field Manual-United States Government Printing Office-Washington D.C-1950 as discovered by this scribe in the store room of Tactical Wing Nowshera one very notoriously cold evening in January 1991 and General Staff Publication Number-1622- Troop Leading in Armoured Corps -1967 and General Staff Publication Number-1851- Troop Leading in Armoured Corps-1991-GHQ Rawalpindi. One glaring example is one of the ugliest and shabbiest map of a tank counter attack taken from the 1950 US manual and reproduced without any improvement in both the Pakistani publications of 1967 and 1991 ! Even a ten-year-old can draw a better and far neater map! There are pencil cuttings on the US manual which once incorporated by a typist typing a new draft , exactly match with the typed final proof of the Pakistani tank manual!

59 Page-243-Correlli Barnett-Op Cit.

60 Page-493-Article-Infantry Thinking-Lieutenant General Atiq Ur Rahman - Soldier Speaks-Selected Articles from “Pakistan Army Journal”-1956-1981 - Army Education Press-GHQ-Rawalpindi-1981.

61 See Page-42-Brig A.R Siddiqi-Op Cit. Brig Siddiqi states in his excellent and thought provoking book , that General Azam “carried with him a copy of the newly published ‘Rommel Papers’ and was full of it”.

62 Page-26-Brig Z.A Khan-Op Cit.Brig Z.A Khan states that Liddell Hart’s book was given to all cadets in the military academy. I hold Liddell Hart in very high esteem and as a matter of fact started my study of military history with this book and Palit’s essentials of miltary knowledge .However it is not clear what purpose Liddell Hart could serve for cadets in a military academy learning the basics of infantry tactics. I may add that I met very few officers during my entire military service who had read this particular book of Liddell Hart from first to last page.

63 Page-209-Gul Hassan Khan-Op Cit

64 Based on orders of battle of various divisions given in - The Pakistan Army-War-1965-Major General Shaukat Riza (Retired) - Army Education Press-GHQ-Rawalpindi -1984.

65 Page-126-Behind the Scene-An Analysis of India’s Military Operations-1947-1971-Major General Joginder Singh (Retired) - Lancer International-New Delhi-11993.

66 Page -126-Ibid.

67 Page-343-Gurcharan Singh Sandhu -Op Cit.

68 Page-344-Ibid.

69 Ibid.

70 Page-123-Shauakat Riza-Op Cit.

71 According to the 11 Cavalry history it was 0855 hours while according to Brigadier A.A.K Chaudhry it was 0830 hours .See Page-49-September 1965-Before and After-Brig Amjad Ali Khan Chaudhry-Ferozesons Limited-Lahore-1977.Page -Page-43-Short History of 11 Cavalry (FF)-Lieutenant Colonel Mohammad Khalid -Quetta Cantonment-1999.Published by the unit and distributed only to selected list of serving and retired officers. The readers may note that 11 Cavalry’s history was compiled only 42 years after independence through sole voluntary efforts of Lieutenant Colonel Khalid , despite the fact that the unit produced many two three and four star generals from 1947 to date. Brigadier Amjad Ali Khan Chaudhry’s book soon went out of stock after its publication in 1977-78 .Interestingly this scribe found it at a outwardly most hopeless looking bookshop at Kohat some “Aziz News Agency” on Monday 30th March 1981 on the evening of the fourth day of the ISSB at Kohat . At that time the ISSB used to last for five days.

72 Page-49-Brig Amjad Chaudhry-Op Cit.

73 Page-394-Gurcharan Singh-Op Cit.

74 Page-101- War Despatches- Lieutenant General Harbaksh Singh-Lancer International-New Delhi-1992.

75 Page-10 and 11-Brigadier Riaz ul Karim-Op Cit. Mishandling of the 5 Armoured Brigade is a well confirmed fact and there is a consensus in Pakistani military analysts and direct participants that it was mishandled on 7th, 8th and 9th September 1965. Refers:— Page-56-Musa Khan-Op Cit. Musa thus observed “Twice in two days,5 Armoured Brigade reached Valtoha railway station and Assal Uttar,approximately 12 and 6 miles respectively beyond Khem Karan,but for inexplicable reasons,the brigade commander issued confusing orders on it on both occasions to return to Khem Karan and leaguer there at night,instead of arranging to send up motorised infantry to hold the ground his armour had captured”. Also see Page- 200-Gul Hassan Khan-Op Cit. Also pages-238 & 239-Pakistan Meets Indian Challenge-Brigadier Gulzar Ahmad-Al Mukhtar Publishers-1967 and Reprinted by-Islamic Book Foundation-Lahore-1986 The Leaguer is a formation adopted by an armoured regiment or squadron after the battle. Leaguer was a conservative British countermeasure adopted after last light to secure tanks against night raids by tank hunting parties.The Germans noted this serious British failing in North Africa (See Pages-109-The North African Campaign -Captain B.H Liddell Hart-Reprinted by Natraj Publishers-Dera Dun-1983) which led to loss of initiative as well as time and space.The Germans on the contrary did not adhere to this ridiculously cautious drill or battle procedure but occupied the same area that they had occupied in the days fight at night.But Bashir following the typical British tradition was concerned more with safety than with rapid progress of operations. After all “Mission Oriented Approach” had no chance in the “Orders Oriented “ army of that time and with my thirteen years service from 1981-1994 even of this time ! In all fairness to Bashir it may be said that he was at least on papers among the best and he did what was taught or interpreted at schools of instruction as such . He was a product of that age and must be viewed with this perspective. Innovation , dynamic thinking and serious professional study had limited room in the old polo playing ceremonial British Indian Army. Even Gul who so vehemently criticised Bashir, had no tank experience in WW II having been from infantry and an aide de camp throughout the war . So no one can never know how Gul or any other armour brigade commander may have behaved in that situation. There was one man who may have behaved differently , but he was from infantry i.e the indomitable Brigadier Eftikhar Khan , a half Pakistani/Janjua who was at least technically a non Muslim ,had he lived in Mr Bhutto’s time being from the Ahmadiya community!Later around 1950s emphasis on ceremonial and polo playing was largely substituted by sycophancy once all patronage was concentrated in the hands of one man from 1958 to 1988 whether a civilian or an army man . The situation today is that the army is composed of more educated ( professionally) but more ambitious, far more calculating and careerist type men. Men who would make good bankers and excellent peace time decision makers when all is well , but certainly not men of crisis, which unfortunately occur rarely .These are the typical hole punching men well described in “Crisis in Command by Gabriel and Savage. Of all the people above cited Brigadier Riaz ul Karim, MC , who never became a general is definitely the most competent in his criticism since he was the only one from armoured corps who commanded a tank squadron in Burma and also won an MC . All praise to the Ayubian selection boards that this most professional man was not promoted while men like Bashir and Nasir became Major Generals . After all Riazul Karim was neither from those indomitable martial races north of Chenab,nor did he have that pleasing sycophantic personality that gave the south of Chenab races a waiver to enter general rank ! I had the opportunity of meeting this very fine gentleman and officer on various evenings in Lahore’s Polo Ground where he used to come to refresh himself with an evening walk in the 1990s. The jogging track of that Polo Ground on Sarwar Road apart from the other more sensually refreshing spectacles is a military historians paradise since one gets the opportunity to meet many retired officers of all ranks and types. Alas that old breed is fast vanishing and many historical records will be lost since Pakistani officers are not interested in writing.

76 Page -94-Harbaksh Singh-Op Cit.

77 Page-357-Gurcharan Singh-Op Cit.

78 Page-206 & 207-Shaukat Riza-1965-Op Cit and Page-180-Brigadier Z.A Khan-Op Cit

(To be continued)

Pakistans Rapid Transformation-Khwaja

2009-11-30T10:06:00.000-08:00

as i look back i see rapid transformations in pakistan.

30 years ago karachi was the most peaceful city in the world.today it is a dangerous place.

30 years ago even a 12 bore was regarded as a dangerous weapon.today lahore and all cities bristle with private owned automatics

30 years ago army was respected.today army officers are under attack in islamabad and even the army headquarters has been attacked.

as a retired government servant with a strong military background i feel that the fault is not in our stars but in ourselves.

zulfiqar ali bhutto introduced religion in pakistani politics by declaring ahmadis non muslims.

zia misused ideology .

musharraf had no ideology

benazir was clever but selfish

nawaz sharif is harmless but dumb

shahbaz sharif is fast but has ulterior motives

the problems of future need great leaders political and military and we have none.

AIR BASES 1971 WAR

2009-11-25T04:38:00.000-08:00

IAF IN ITS PRELIMINARY YEARS

2009-11-25T00:04:00.001-08:00

INTRODUCTION - THE IAF IN ITS PRELIMINARY YEARS

P.C LAL

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The Indian Air Force (IAF) was officially born on 08 October 1932, when the Indian Air Force (IAF) act became effective. On that day six Indians were granted the King's commission on passing out as pilots and ground duty officers from RAF Cranwell. They had been sent earlier in 1930 and five of them became pilots while the sixth became a Ground Duty Officer. Among the five pilots were such well known names like Subroto Mukherjee, who became the first Indian Chief of Air Staff and Awan who had later opted for the Pakistan Air Force.

No.1 Squadron IAF, came into being on 1 April 1933 at Drigh Road, Karachi. There were five pilots commanded by an RAF officer and the first batch of Hawai Sepoys. The complement of the squadron consisted of four Westland Wapiti biplanes comprising 'A' Flight of the squadron. After 3 years of training, in which time more pilots joined the squadron. It was inducted into the North West Frontier Province (NWFP), which is now in Pakistan. The primary aim was to support the RAF and the Army in its operations against the frontier tribesmen.

Stationed at Miranshah, the pilots flew many sorties in their rickety aircraft, often suffering casualties in the form of forced landings or stopped engines due to the tribesmen firing. Throughout this period, with more pilots being trained at a rate of 5 to 6 per year, two more flights were raised and at the outbreak of the second world war, No.1 Squadron IAF was well experienced in its role of army cooperation, having received its baptism of fire at the frontier.

At the outbreak of the war, the IAF put into effect various expansion plans to raise more new squadrons. An RAF squadron at Risalpur was made responsible for training of aircrew and invitations were sent to commercial pilot license holders to join the newly created Indian Air Force Volunteer Reserve (IAFVR).

About a 100 such pilots joined the IAFVR and among them were men like P.C. Lal, Rajaram, etc. who rose to high posts after the war. All these pilots after a short conversion course were posted to newly raised coastal defence flights. They flew aircraft like the Wapiti, the Hart, Audax and some other types which have been requisitioned from civil owners. They flew long surveillance missions over the coastal waters and some times escorted ship convoys over sea lanes.

With the entry of Japan into the War, the expansion of the Indian Air Force was rapid. Flying schools were set up at Walton near Lahore and at Ambala. Two operational training units came up at Risalpur (for fighters) and Peshawar (for ground attack). The squadrons grew from one to ten.

A total of 3000 officers and 25,000 men were trained in the period 1942-45. Some 600 pilots flew with the ten squadrons, all of them seeing action against the Japanese in Burma. Some pilots attached to the RAF were sent to North Africa and England and saw action against the Germans and the Italians.

On the Burma front, the Indian AF flew in aircraft inferior to the Japanese. These aircraft, Hurricanes and Vengeances were those discarded by the RAF. Throughout the war, the IAF had to make do with aircraft discarded by the RAF as inferior and it was only at the end of the war did the IAF acquire the latest Marks Spitfires. In spite of this handicap it faired well in the war.

Field Marshal Slim in praising No.6 Dragons Squadron wrote, "I was impressed with the conduct of a reconnaissance squadron of the Indian Air Force. Flying in pairs the Indian pilots in their outmoded Hurricanes went out, time and again, in the face of overwhelming enemy fighter superiority...They were a happy, efficient, and a very gallant squadron." Coming from one of the greatest Generals of World War II it was proof indeed of the bravery of the pilots.

When the war ended Indian pilots had earned 1 DSO, 23 DFCs (including 1 bar) and a host of numerous other awards. In doing so it lost some 60 pilots killed in action. These figures would seem small compared to the RAF or the land armies but it should be remembered that the number that constituted the IAF was also small. The Indian Air Force's contribution to the victory of the commonwealth was recognised by King George VI who conferred the prefix "Royal" to the title making it the Royal Indian Air Force.

After the war ended, the IAF had ten fighter squadrons flying Hurricanes and Spitfire XIV's. It had sent one squadron (No.4) with the British Commonwealth Occupation Force in Japan. Some were at the frontier undergoing training and keeping guard. About the time it was thought necessary to raise a transport squadron.

Some individual pilots have had some experience on transport aircraft during the war but no special transport unit existed. So accordingly No.12 Squadron was raised with ten Dakotas in 1946. Even before training could commence a tropical storm came and wrote off all the aircraft. Despite this inauspicious start, No.12 began training on Oxfords, till replacement Dakotas began arriving.

More Spitfires and new Tempest II fighter bombers became available and the squadrons re-equipped with them, phasing out the Hurricanes. In the training role Harvards and Tigermoths were the mainstay for years to come. These were supplemented by the Percival Prentice and the Cornell trainers.

As partition became inevitable, so was the division of the Armed Forces. New India’s share of the Air Force amounted to seven fighter and one transport squadrons. Pakistan received two fighter and one newly raised transport squadron. The RIAF lost all of its permanent training establishments and major bases as they were all located in Pakistani territory. So all establishments had to be rebuilt from scratch.

The first Chief of Air Staff was Air Marshal Sir Thomas Elmhirst of the RAF. He was later succeeded by Air Marshal Sir Ivelew Chapman and later by Air Marshal Sir Eric Gibbs. All the three British service Officers served the Air Force well during their tenures as Air Chiefs. It was under their tenure that the expansion plan of the Air Force was drawn up and that the IAF fought in its first war.

Free India's Air Force had its first taste of action during the invasion of the Kashmir valley by the frontier tribesmen. These tribesmen, financially aided & armed by Pakistan and led by Army deserters, poured into Kashmir on 20 October 1947, and went into a frenzy killing, ransacking and pillaging through the Kashmiri villages. In reply to the Maharajah's plea for help and after his signing of the accession, India decided to send troops to Srinagar by air.

No.12 Squadron with its DC-3 Dakotas along with those of private airlines helped in the airlift. It was a remarkable achievement at such a short notice. Taking off from Palam the first Indian troops were landed at Srinagar airfield at 0930hrs on October 27th. At that time it wasn't even known whether the airfield has fallen to the tribesmen or not, but the risk was taken. On the first day the IAF and civilian Dakotas had airlifted the 1st battalion, The Sikh regiment and thus secured the safety of the airfield.

On October 28th, Tempests from Ambala attacked Enemy positions at Patan. Two days later the first Spitfires were flown to Srinagar, joining the Harvards which were already flown there. Fuel to keep these aircraft was hard to come by, but the Army developed ingenious methods to provide the necessary fuel. As soon as any Dakota landed, a jeep with a drum in its back would approach the aircraft, and with the pilots consent, the men would siphon off any extra amount of fuel that the captain of the aircraft would spare. The fuel thus collected kept the Spitfires flying later for the crucial battles of Badgam and Shalateng.

On November 3rd, the decisive battle of Badgam was fought in the vicinity of Srinagar airfield where the enemy launched a surprise attack. It was in this battle that Major Somnath Sharma was awarded the Param Vir Chakra (PVC) posthumously.

Two RIAF Spitfires came to the aid of the Indian Army by strafing the enemy attackers. The combined Army-Air Force onslaught beat back the attack. Four days later on November 7th, the battle of Shalateng took place which routed the enemy. The tribesmen kept retreating till Uri. Tempests of No.7 Sqn played an important part. according to Brigadier L.P. Sen, 400+ bodies were counted between Srinagar and Baramula, almost all due to air action.

Later on, Tempests provided much needed air support to the Army in the area of the Uri bowl where the fighting had stabilized. RIAF Tempests strafed and rocketed enemy concentrations at Kot, helped in the advance to Tithwal, dropped vital ammunition and food supplies to the beleaguered Skardu garrison. They destroyed enemy field guns at Poonch, and in a daring and spectacular low level air raid, destroyed the bridges over the Domel and Kishenganga rivers in the face of heavy ack-ack fire.

The lone transport Squadron was not left behind. No.12, in the course of its regular casualty evacuation and transport duties, airlifted 25 Pounder field guns to Poonch, flew the first troops to Leh, which was the first aircraft to land at Leh, and even bombing sorties in support of the army with the bombs being rolled out of the cargo bay by the aircrew.

The main driving force behind the squadron was Air Commodore Meher Singh, the head of the operational group in J&K. Meher Singh himself led many of the pioneering flights including the ones to Leh and Poonch. For leading and guiding the air operations in Jammu & Kashmir, he received the Maha Vir Chakra. Wing Commander K.L. Bhatia, CO No.12 Squadron, got the Vir Chakra as did many pilots of the squadron.

The fighting ended on 31 December 1948, the cease-fire bought about by UN Mediation. The IAF acquitted itself well earning four MVCs and 23 VrCs. Not much is known about its losses but at least one fighter, a Tempest was lost in the Tithwal area due to ack-ack fire. The pilot, Flying Officer U.G. Wright, baled out and had a harrowing experience during his parachute descent. He was fired at by rifles, LMG's and even 3" mortars! But he made it back to our lines.

One RIAF DC-3 went missing on the second day of the conflict, during the airlift and nothing was heard about the pilot, Ft. Lt. C.J. Mendoza and the 20 passengers till almost 40 years later, when the wreckage was stumbled upon and the remains of the crew members were laid to rest. No air-to-air encounters took place between the RPAF and the RIAF but on one occasion a lone RPAF Dakota was intercepted by two Tempests over Chilas.

Squadron Leader Masamalani and Flight Lieutenant Dogra were rocketing Chilas and stumbled onto the RPAF Dakota. However, inspite of radio warnings and firing across the path of the Dakota, the RPAF pilot slipped across the border. Later getting a "Sitara-E-Juraat" award for the escape.

Meanwhile down south, the Hyderabad police action was in progress. Here too the RIAF lent a hand to the Army. Tempests and Dakotas saw much action ,strafing, bombing and dropping leaflets against the Nizam's forces. However the scale of operations is minuscule compared to the Kashmir operations.

The end of the hostilities gave the RIAF some breathing space. It went ahead with its re-equipment plans and to build up as a 20 squadron force. About a 100 Spitfires and Tempests were acquired from Britain. To build up a bomber complement, the RIAF salvaged about 40 odd B-24 Liberator bombers from the ex-USAAF scrapyard at Kanpur and put these relics into the air. Initially, Lancaster bombers were offered by Britain, but it was decided to acquire more fighters with the same money and build up the required bomber force with the salvaged aircraft.

In November 1948, the RIAF became the first air arm in Asia to equip with Jet fighters. No.7 Sqn started inducting De Havilland Vampires bought from Britain and eventually some 400 were acquired. These vampires saw action even after 23 years in the 1971 war.

1950 saw India becoming a Republic. This led to all Royal titles being dropped and the RIAF was no exception. On 26 January 1950, she was just know as the Indian Air Force (IAF). Also, in order not to become dependent on only Great Britain for its arms purchases, the IAF started purchasing aircraft from other sources. In 1953 the Dassault Ouragan re-christened Toofani by the IAF was inducted. Belonging to the same generation as the Vampire, 104 of these straight winged fighters were received by the IAF.

On 1st April 1954, Air Marshal Subroto Mukherjee took over as the first Indian Chief of Air Staff. Mukherjee was the first Indian to command a squadron in the IAF and now he was the first Indian Air Chief. He had a good relationship with Nehru and this helped him to get the required allocation of finances for the air forces expansion plans.

During this period it can be certainly be said that the Air Force received privileged treatment more than the Army. When its Pakistani counterpart started inducting F-86 Sabres, efforts were made to acquire Hunter Mk.6 from the British. But the British did not release the Mk.6 for export and they offered only the Mk.4. So Mystere IV-A fighter-bombers were acquired from France. It was with the Mysteres that IAF pilots could break the sound barrier for the first time and later when the Hunter Mk.6 was cleared for export, the IAF acquired them too.

The offensive capability received a boost with Canberra bombers being purchased and Gnat fighters supplemented the interceptor force. Besides India, Finland was the only country to operate this diminutive fighter, while Britain operated Trainer versions.

The transport fleet was also increased to meet with the demands of India's great geographical size. Besides inducting more trustworthy Dakotas, Devons and Viscounts were bought in. One squadron of Ilyushin-14's were purchased. American Fairchild C-119 flying Packets joined the transport fleet. This aircraft could carry twice the cargo load that a Dakota could manage and thus were a welcome addition to the force.

The decision to manufacture the new Avro Hs.748 was taken and the agreement with Britain was signed in 1958. In 1960, No.44 Squadron was raised on Antonov-12s, which were the Russian equivalent of the American C-130 Hercules, which Pakistan had already got. In spite of all these additions, India's transport force was stretched to its limits by the increasing geographical and strategic demands.

The helicopter wing of the air force was born with some Bell 47 two seaters forming the initial equipment and soon some S-55 Whirlwinds joined the force. To cope with the High altitude operations the Russian Mi-4 was tested and found suitable and large numbers were inducted.

One thing is certain, the IAF was never starved out of money. Its expansion plans proceeded at an uninterrupted pace, without much canvassing on its part. What made the government favour the IAF over the Army? One theory is that the government was more keen on developing a "visible military force" as part of its political diplomacy, and the IAF fitted the part.

It was a lopsided policy, we had the best transport aircraft that money can buy but had no adequate parachutes to drop supplies at forward posts. The government would be most eager to buy shiny new fighters but be most miserly in purchasing spares for them.

Aircraft like the Spitfire and Tempest continued in service till 1956, the Dakota was in service till the 80s and the Liberator till 1967. It became difficult for the IAF to manage an effective air arm but it managed nevertheless, thanks to the men who led it.

Air Marshal Mukherjee died an untimely and tragic death in Japan while still in service and was succeeded by Air Marshal Aspy Merwan Engineer. Air Marshal Engineer, a DFC from Burma, was one of the famous Engineer brothers. It was in his tenure that the Indo-China conflict flared up. But before we go into this conflict, let us see how the IAF did in other short but limited encounters.

After more than twelve years, the Indian Air Force saw combat in a foreign land, fighting for a world cause. Six Canberras from No.5 Squadron were attached to the United Nations force in Congo. India also sent a brigade of troops there, and the Canberras were to support the operations of the UN there. The Canberras were under the command of Wg. Cdr. AIK Suares.

On 6 December 1961, after clashes broke out between UN forces and the Katangan rebels, The Canberras, operating from Leopoldville, attacked the Katangan airbase at Kolwazi. In the raid, they destroyed four Fouga Magister jets, the fuel dump and a bridge at Lufira. Besides they flew close support sorties for UN troops fighting on the ground, as well as escort missions for the USAF transport aircraft bringing in supplies. This was the first time that jet aircraft of the IAF went into action. The IAF acquitted itself well in this operation.

In the same month back in India, Operation Vijay, the plan to liberate Goa took place. There was no Portuguese air opposition and Canberras, Hunters, Ouragans and Vampires operated with impunity. Dabolim airport and the airstrip in Diu were put out of commission. Portuguese strong holds were attacked to smoothen up the Army's advance.

However, on one occasion, Vampires of No.45 Squadron operating from Belgaum were called up by the 2 Sikh LI to soften up Portuguese positions at Mapusa, and they ended up bombing positions of our own, 17th Para Fd Regt, injuring two. Throughout the action no Portuguese anti-aircraft fire was encountered and the whole operation can be termed as an exercise for the Indian Air Force to test itself.

The dawn of the new year bought forth new threats to the borders. A confrontation with China happened in October 1962. The Army had established posts in remote corners of Ladakh and NEFA. It became the IAF's responsibility to supply these posts from the air. The IAF had for some years did supply dropping in the jungles of Assam, and it continued doing so in Ladakh and NEFA.

Most of the time during the supply drops, the parachutes carrying the supplies would drift away into inaccessible valleys and gorges. A policy of reusing used parachutes recovered from these places saw supplies falling to the ground with unopened parachutes. In all the Army estimated that it recovered only 40% of the supplies airdropped by the Air Force, and it was barely sufficient to maintain its posts.

The Indo-China war started on 20th October 1962, with Chinese troops launching a heavy attack on Indian positions at the Tsangdhar area, in NEFA. On that day the IAF lost two Bell helicopters in quick succession to Chinese ground fire.

Before that, while the Indian troops were fighting for the posts, a lone Dakota came over lazily on its usual supply dropping run and the crew were shocked at being fired upon by the Chinese. This was the first indication that the IAF had of the war. No one had informed the Air Force authorities of the battle that had started three hours before.

Throughout the hostilities, IAF helicopters were primarily engaged in evacuating casualties. And after the Chinese ceasefire, in picking up numerous stragglers of the broken up 4th Infantry Division making there way back to the plains, most of these stragglers were forced to trek back across the country and suffered severe mental and physical strain on the way.

Scores of them were picked up by the helicopters including a Divisional commander himself. One Mi-4 helicopter was lost to ground fire in November 1962, another was abandoned at Zimithaung and it fell into Chinese hands intact. They later returned it after the ceasefire as a "gesture of goodwill."

On the Walong front, the IAF was the only means of supply and reinforcement to the Indian troops there. The only aircraft capable of operating from that airstrip was the Otter. These flew in supply and CASEVAC (Casualty Evacuation) missions till Walong fell.

One Otter which was made unserviceable by the Chinese shelling was abandoned. This was also later returned by the Chinese as a goodwill gesture. In most other wars, aircraft are deliberately destroyed to prevent their capture in the enemy hands. Sadly, no one found time to undertake such measures in the race to retreat.

While the situation in NEFA was bad, the IAF's performance in Aksai Chin in Ladakh was nothing short of excellent. The IAF's only AN-12 Squadron operated in this sector. They flew in reinforcements in the form of additional troops and AMX-13 tanks to everywhere, from Daulet Beg Oldi to Chushul. The PSP runway at Chushul almost disintegrated under the daily landings of these aircraft. At Leh, when after the cease-fire, a detachment of American C-130's landed there and the pilots were amazed at the tough and backward infrastructure facilities existing there. And with which the IAF was operating regularly.

Two questions remain in the readers minds about the 1962 conflict. Why was the Indian Air Force not used in an offensive role? And would it have made any difference if it had been used? It was thought at that time that the Chinese Air Force would retaliate if our air force was bought in.

The decision not to use the IAF was purely a political one, which unfairly displays a lack of trust in the ability of our own Air Force to defend our side. It was not known at that time that the Chinese Air Force was grounded due to shortage of fuel and if it had tried to bomb Indian cities, the IAF would certainly had the upper hand, as both our pilots and aircraft were much better than those of the Chinese.

The answer to the second question depends on a lot of factors. In Ladakh the Chinese attacked in masse, and in open areas and in broad daylight, employing field and rocket artillery. In the terrain, in which there was no vegetation, the IAF would have had a field day in attacking the ground targets. The Battles of Rezang La, Gurung Hill and Chushul would definitely have had different outcomes.

But we suffered our main reverses in NEFA where the Chinese employed no artillery, no road transport, where they had lots of forest cover to use for hiding, and most important of all, the Chinese there fought by outflanking moves, never using the road, but the numerous tracks in the jungles. Air power can only be used during the day, and the Chinese mounted night attacks at most of the places. They could afford to lie low during the day and move only in the nights. Thus nullifying most of the airpower advantage we had.

The IAF might have won a victory in the air but it would not have altered the situation in NEFA. Achieving air superiority would be meaningless if it was not exploited to wreck the enemies ground forces and more so if our own ground forces lack the ability to defend itself, which was what actually happened. Having the air situation in your favour does not alter the fact that your Generals are not up to the mark.

If it wasn't for the Chinese war we would have been caught off balance in 1965. And the consequences would have been more than the loss of barren uninhabited territory, and the 6000 men killed, missing or POW as in the Chinese invasion. The IAF came through the war with a bitter sense of disappointment.

It was not allowed to have a crack at the enemy, and its pride wasn't better from the fact that the Prime Minister Nehru had asked for protection for Indian cities from American planes while it was there to do the job. It would have been fair to say that it was not the defeat of the Armed Forces but the defeat of our politicians pet dreams.

After the war aid came from all over, Canada supplied Caribou STOL transports, France speeded up the supplies of Alloutte III helicopters, while the Americans loaned us the services of a C-130 Squadron and also supplied some old used Packets. A squadron of Otters was also procured from the Canadians.

The government entered into an agreement for the supply of MiG-21 fighters from the Soviet Union. Preparations were made to undertake production of the fighter. Old disused airfields in the North-East were reactivated, the result of which in the war nine years later, the IAF had no shortage of airfields to operate from.

To beef up the radar and communications network we got some old radar units from the United States, called the Air Defence Ground Environment System or ADGES. A plan was mutually agreed to set up a troop-scatter communication system. And one unit was being set up when the 1965 war started and further work was stopped.

To help the IAF assess its weaknesses and rectify them, an exercise was conducted jointly with the USAF and the RAF in 1963. For the first time, IAF Hunters operated alongside the Javelins of the RAF and the F-100 Super Sabres of the USAF. The Exercise aptly named Siksha was helpful for the IAF in gaining invaluable experience. Though the object was to learn to meet the Chinese threat, it helped in assessing the Pakistani threat too.

Perhaps the most important development was the approval of the government for the Indian Air Force to expand to a 45 Squadron force. The implementation of this plan would demand a tremendous effort from all those in the service.

On 1 August 1964, Air Marshal Arjan Singh D.F.C. took over as the Chief of Air Staff from Air Marshal Aspy Engineer. A tall and well built Sikh, he was a man of courage, no flamboyance, a rare combination of dignity, modesty, firmness and decision. He saw action in Burma, and was a distinguished pilot, and was the first Air Chief to be medically and operationally fit to fly all types of aircraft, including the latest type of jet fighters.

He had kept himself in flying trim by going to the squadrons and flying with them during their training. And as a flier to the end of his term he could have led a squadron into battle if the need ever rose. On Arjan Singh fell the responsibility to supervise the increase in the size of the Indian Air Force and train it in the shortest possible time.

Air Marshal Aspy Engineer was doing just that for an year and seven months and it was now Arjan Singh's job to complete what his predecessor had started, to forge the Indian Air Force into a formidable fighting machine. But he would never know that, because both he and his command would be put to test in less than an year.

Why not a civilian head of ISI?

2009-11-24T09:57:00.000-08:00

Why not a civilian head of ISI?

November 17, 2009
By: Kamran Shafi
In view of the fact that the cardinal sin of the federal government to try and put the ISI under civilian control is cited as a reason behind all the obituaries presently being written about the imminent fall of a) just the president; b) all the major politicians; and c) the whole shoot, I’ve been trolling through the Internet to see how just many of the world’s top intelligence services are headed by serving military (in Pakistan’s case, read ‘army’) officers.
And how many are appointed by the army chief. Consider what I’ve come up with.
Except for two retired army officers in the early days, one a lieutenant colonel the other a major general, all the DGs of MI5, the “United Kingdom’s internal counter-intelligence and security agency were civil servants. The director-general reports to the home secretary, although the Security Service is not formally part of the home office”, and through him to the prime minister.“The Secret Intelligence Service (SIS), colloquially known as MI6 is the United Kingdom’s external intelligence agency. Under the direction of the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC), it works alongside the Security Service (MI5), Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) and the defence intelligence staff (DIS).” Except for one naval captain, an admiral, a lieutenant colonel and a major general in the very early days, all of them retired, every single chief of this agency has been a ‘bloody civilian’, some from within its own ranks, others from the civil service. The present director is Britain’s former ambassador to the United Nations. The director reports to the chief cabinet secretary and through him to the prime minister.
Directors of Mossad, the dreaded Israeli intelligence agency which seems to be running rings (if reports in our conservative press and on our fire-breathing TV channels are to be believed) around our very own Mother of All Agencies, has been headed mostly by retired military officials (remember please that military service is compulsory in Israel) but also by ‘bloody civilians’. Mossad’s director is appointed by the prime minister and reports directly to him.
The director of the Central Intelligence Agency reports to the director of national intelligence (DNI), who in turn reports to the White House. The director is appointed by the president after recommendation from the DNI, and must be confirmed by a majority vote of the Senate. While there is no statutory provision which specifically excludes active military personnel from being nominated for the position, most directors have been civilians.
Barring Gen Reinhard Gehlen who set up the German intelligence agency Abteilung Fremde Heere Ost to principally keep an eye on the Russian easternfront during the Second World War, the present federal intelligence service, Bundesnachrichtendienst(BND), has always been headed by civilian public officials, notably by civil servant, lawyer and politician of the liberal Free Democratic Party, Klaus Kinkel who rose to be Germany’s federal minister of justice (1991–1992), foreign minister (1992–1998) and vice chancellor of Germany (1993–1998).
Next door in India all directors of RAW have been civilians, either civil servants or policemen or officials from within its own ranks. While the director RAW, also known as ‘Secretary (R)’, is under the direct command of the prime minister, he reports on an administrative basis to the cabinet secretary. However, on a daily basis ‘Secretary (R)’ reports to the national security adviser to the prime minister.
RAW too, if the press and TV channels are to be taken seriously, is running rings around us in close collaboration with Mossad.
So then, why is it that only in our country, our intelligence service is the fief of the army, and only of the army? Surely there are competent people other than generals who could well head the organisation and be a credit to it? I mean if all of the world’s leading agencies can be headed by civilians why not our ISI?
Meanwhile, back at the ranch, what is known as the ‘Ghairat Lobby’ has taken yet another drubbing with the most recent report of the LA Times to the effect that ever since 9/11 fully one-third of the CIA’s budget has been diverted to the ISI. It also reminds us brutally what the Commando has already told us in his ‘book’ (stand up, Humayun Gohar): that the ISI sold people, some surely terrorists some very surely innocent, to the Americans for cash payments as low as $5000 a go, and as high as millions of dollars for those who had huge head moneys on offer for their capture/death.
It also tells us that the CIA money was in addition to the $15bn that poured into the country during the Commando’s dictatorship. In the words of the LA Times the ISI, “had also collected tens of millions of dollars through a classified CIA programme that pays for the capture or killing of wanted militants, a clandestine counterpart to the rewards publicly offered by the State Department”. Will the Ghairat Lobby please sit up and take note, and understand that such reports make its ghairatmand stand on the Kerry-Lugar Law all the more ludicrous and hypocritical.
Let me here once more caution the leaders of the major political parties, the PML-N and the PPP: please close ranks and collectively beat back the ongoing assault on democracy by the establishment. Our country simply cannot take another extra-legal intervention (I did not say martial law) to remove any one individual, or two, from the scene. To President Zardari let me say, yet again: do not prevaricate, act now on the Charter of Democracy; break away from the too-clever-by-half -self-servers that you have surrounded yourself with.
To Mr Nawaz Sharif, this: Asif Zardari is not the only target of the establishment, he is only the first. You are next. Consider: if there is an anti-AZ story on one page, there is an anti-NS story on another page of the same newspaper on the same day. The Internet is full of planted stories on both the large political parties; stories that desperately try to turn lay people away from electoral politics. Be prepared for more dirt.
United you politicians will stand, divided you will fall.
P.S. The Balochistan High Court has ordered Musharraf to appear before it in the case of Nawab Akbar Bugti’s murder. How come there is no further reporting on this earth-shaking event, weeks down the line, as if it never happened?

2009-11-24T09:51:00.000-08:00

Army knows how to protect National Interest
by
Maqbool Malik

KAMRA – Chief of the Army Staff General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani has made it clear that the United States will have to take Pakistan into confidence over new Afghan policy.The COAS said this while informally talking to a group of senior journalists shortly after the rollout ceremony of Pakistan’s first JF-17 aircraft here Monday. Gen Kayani said Americans knew that the Pakistan’s role was very much essential for stability in Afghanistan. “We know how to protect our national interests,” he added.When his attention was drawn towards US efforts to review its Afghan policy, General Kayani said the US would have to take Pakistan on board about its future Afghan policy. “The US leadership realises the importance of Pakistan and its key role in the war against terror. Therefore, it is out of question that US can sideline Pakistan on such an important issue”, General Kayani maintained. He defended the timing of operation Rah-e-Nijat launched to target the terror networks of late Baitullah Mehsud in South Waziristan Agency, saying security forces had the requisite element of surprise. “We launched the offensive and took the terrorists by surprise,” he added.General Kayani added that the operation was launched precisely one and a half hour after the high level briefing at the Prime Minister House, Islamabad on October 17.The COAS also dismissed the notion that hardcore TTP leaders and commanders had escaped to Afghanistan, adding that terrorists had failed to resist the operation and were on the run. “We are trying to hunt them in effort, and they are left with no space to regroup,” the COAS said.He explained that the security forces had made very important gains in Operation Rah-e-Nijat and vowed to hunt down the terrorists come what may.Besides securing key areas from terrorists and destruction of their bases, the security forces in South Waziristan have killed at least 550 terrorists and apprehended 15 others, whereas 60 security forces personnel have been martyred and 150 injured since the launch of Operation Rah-e-Nijat on October 17.

An Indian Colonel Analyses Pakistan GHQ Attack

2009-11-24T09:47:00.000-08:00

Pakistan GHQ Attack: Some Key Questions

by Col. Rahul K. Bhonsle

The venomous terrorist attack on Islamabad’s Army Headquarters on 10th October has raised some key questions. What is the level of penetration of fundamentalists in the military, how effective are the controls over nuclear weapons, what is the morale of the army after the attack and how autonomous are Punjab based terrorist groups needs answers? The nature of the terrorist attack, the response of the security forces and subsequent reactions raise questions even on survivability of the Pakistani state with the only instrument capable of holding it together the Army seemingly in disarray. A survey of the attack would denote the reasons for this skepticism.
The Pakistan Army Headquarters, called as General Head Quarter or GHQ is in the garrison town of Rawalpindi near Mall Road. Rawalpindi garrison is hundred-year old and surrounded by civilian colonies thus it is not possible to close roads passing by the GHQ as per the Army public relations office. A new GHQ building was to come up, but this plan was shelved as the Army was facing resource crunch due to collapse of the Pakistan economy. The location was vulnerable and high security was essential.
The GHQ is heavily guarded with a infantry battalion nominated for the same including some of the key officers residential quarters. There are multiple barriers and vehicles are checked at each barrier. There is no clear run through given and vehicles have to zig zag through the barriers thereby preventing a vehicle borne suicide attack as it happened at the Marriot Hotel in Islamabad earlier.
The attack began shortly before noon on 10 October. The extremists arrived in a white car, opened fire near the GHQ and lobbed five hand grenades at the barrier to force their way into the headquarters. Security forces retaliated with gunfire and killed four terrorists, who were dressed in army uniforms. However simultaneously four to five attackers managed to infiltrate the heavily fortified compound using the diversion of the encounter. It is now known that the total number of attackers was ten. While four were killed in the initial others successfully intruded inside.
Initially it was felt by the security forces that all attackers had been killed in the first wave and there was no information of others having infiltrated and taken hostages. However soon there were sporadic firing from within the HQs it was clear that there were more attackers. This gap in reaction was exploited by the terrorists effectively.
The heavily armed attackers took up positions in the area, hurling grenades and firing sporadically at security forces. The personnel in the HQs and the guards were possibly confused by the attackers’ uniforms.
Having entered the compound the attackers held hostages including security men and civilian employees of the army headquarters. In one room, 22 hostages were clustered with three assailants, one of whom wore a suicide bomb jacket. There were 12 hostages in another room, where another assailant wore a suicide jacket.
Brig. Anwar ul-Haq, the director of security for military intelligence was shot in the first hour of the siege by one of the gunmen who had penetrated his building. When ul-Haq heard shooting, he interrupted a conference he was conducting and went into the corridor with an aide. When he saw a man in military uniform with his back turned to him, the brigadier told him to flee, but instead, the man turned around and shot the brigadier. Lt. Colonel Wasim was the other officer killed.
The Pakistani Army Special Services Group Commandoes launched rescue operation ‘Janbaz’. While negotiations were going on, some personnel were also send with food for the hostages, apparently these were allowed in and therefore could collect information. The commandos first killed the suicide bomber in one room, saving the situation from leading to any huge loss, but other militants in the room fired at two of the commandos, killing them. Then the commandoes attacked the other room to rescue the hostages. As commandos approached the second room, another suicide bomber blew himself up, bringing down the roof and causing injuries among the captives.
The terrorists were wearing suicide jackets and had explosives on them, but they could not detonate them as the commando action was underway. The army commandos caught the attackers injured team leader named Aqeel alias Dr. Usman who is said to be in a critical condition when reports last came in as he had attempted to kill himself but was possibly unable to and has been held for interrogation and extraction of information.
Three hostages were killed in the gun battle and all hostages were freed. Three commandoes also lost their lives. The death toll of security men came to 11. Three hostages were killed by the militants 10 militants were also killed and their leader Aqeel, alias Dr Usman arrested alive but was critically injured.
Reactions were forthcoming from across the globe, US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton has said the ghastly terror attack on the Pakistan Army General Headquarters (GHQ) in Rawalpindi has underlined the terror threat facing Pakistan. Clinton said she wants to point that the attack highlights the continuing threats to the Pakistani government and the ‘very important’ steps the civilian leadership, along with the military, are taking to root out the extremists and prevent violence and direct assaults on the sovereignty of the state. Similarly other heads of states including Indian Prime Minister and the Secretary General of the UN condemned the attack.
That there was a security failure should be apparent since the details about a forthcoming attack had been published on the front page of a national daily several days before it happened. The News International, a local English-language newspaper, had published the details of a report by the interior ministry that an attack on the General Headquarters (GHQ) was imminent. The 5 October report said that fighters from militant outfit Lashkar-e-Jhangvi - with the support of the Taliban in South Waziristan - were planning such an attack.
The use of security forces' uniforms by militants is a trend which is well established therefore the Army HQ troops should have been aware of the modus operandi but did not react effectively. The attackers were trained in Waziristan in complex terrorist attacks and included mounting both suicide attacks and sophisticated “fidayeen” assaults. The difference in this attack is also that where previously the militants originated from the tribal areas, now there is an increasing representation from the Punjab and other parts of the country. Southern Punjab is emerging as the hot bed of militancy and people and leaders from the North West Frontier Province are claiming that the government should also launch operations in Southern Punjab, thus indicating possible emergence of a regional divide in the country, which could be dangerous.
Well-informed sources in Pakistan say that the intelligence establishment has failed to identify and weed out the pro-jihadi elements in the Armed Forces and the intelligence establishment
This attack has been followed by a series of attacks in the country over the week leading to a large number of casualties of innocent people mostly common citizens and also police and intelligence personnel. This have shaken up the security establishment.
The other issue is the nuclear weapons. How far are these considered secure given that there could be some penetration of the inner or outer ring by fundamentalist elements in the Army will remain a moot question. The Pakistani establishment needs to provide immediate answers to reassure the World.
There is therefore an urgent need for a security blanket over the most vulnerable areas which should be made virtually impenetrable. In the long run identifying and weeding out fundamentalist elements in the security forces is also essential. Is the Pakistani Army up to the challenge and will it do so immediately needs elaboration?
October 18, 2009

The Evolution of The Pakistan Army

2009-11-24T09:29:00.001-08:00

The Evolution of The Pakistan Army

By Brig. (Ret.) Noor A. Husain

The story of the evolution of the Pakistan Army is the story of the
birth of Pakistan itself against heavy odds. It is a story of
unflinching determination of the Founding Fathers led by the
Quaid-e-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah, and of officers and men to create a
nation and its armed forces.

On 3 June 1947, the British Government announced the plan for the
partition of the sub-continent between India and Pakistan, and for the
transfer of power to the two new states on 15 August 1947. On 30 June
1947, the procedure for the division of the armed forces was agreed
upon by the Partition Council, chaired by the Viceroy of India Lord
Mountbatten and consisting of the top leaders of the Muslim League and
the Indian Congress. Field Marshal Auchinleck, then C-in-C India, was
appointed Supreme Commander under Mountbatten to ensure smooth
division of units, stores and so on. It was announced on 1 July 1947,
that both countries would have operational control of their respective
armed forces by 15 August 1947.

The Early Years
Under the Partition Council a Joint Defence Council was formed with
Viceroy Mountbatten as chairman, under which was an Armed Forces
Reconstitution Committee under FM Auchinleck, consisting of
representatives of the future Indian and Pakistani armies. Between
1939-195, the strength of the Indian Army grew to a maximum of
2,018,196 personnel. On the eve of Partition in 1947, the figure had
come down to about 11,800 officers, 450,000 other ranks plus about
50,000 of Indian Princely State Forces. It is noteworthy that at that
time (as per policy of the British Raj since 1857) there were only two
completely Muslim combat units (1/15 Punjab Regiment and 3/16 Punjab
Regiment), although there were several completely Hindu and Sikh units
and regiments of the combat arms. The original agreement called for
the armed forces and other assets to be divided to the ration of 64%
for India and 36% for Pakistan, but Pakistan was later forced to
accept an 1/3 share of assets. Of the total 46 training
establishments; only nine were located in Pakistan; all of the 17
Ordnance Depots were located in India, as were most of the Ordnance
Depots and Engineer Store Depots. In addition to Pakistan receiving
far less stores than originally stipulated, most of the stores
received were of general nature, perishable, unwanted and obsolete.

The move of 150,000 Pakistani personnel as well 508 units and sub
units of various sizes was to be carried out by rail through Indian
Punjab and Sikh Princely States. After 53 trains carrying personnel
and their families were attacked, detailed and massacred by armed
bands of Sikhs and Hindus in connivance with the railway authorities,
the sea route from Bombay to Karachi was adopted. The Punjab Boundary
Force consisting of five brigades under MajGen Rees was created by FM
Auchinleck's Supreme HQ in August 1947 to escort refugees from border
districts of the two Punjabs across the international borders. Its
area of responsibility covered 37,500 square miles and a population of
14,5 million. It was a gigantic task for a limited force manned
largely by neutral British officers. About seven million Muslims
migrated to Pakistan, and five million Sikhs and Hindus to India; a
million perished.

Against an estimated requirement for about 4,000 officers, Pakistan
had initially only about 2,300 - the gap being filled up on
Quaid-e-Azam's appeal, to some extent, by 484 experienced and
qualified British officers, who volunteered to stay and help Pakistan
and the Pakistan Army in difficult times. Many Polish and Hungarian
officers also volunteered for the medical corps. Prior to August 1947,
the most senior Pakistani (and Indian) officers were in ranks of
brigadiers; after independence, the command of Army units had to be
given to officers in their early 30s with eighteen years service, many
of whom had combat experience and had won battlefield awards in Word
War II. Similarly, brigade commanders had 13-15 years service and
division commanders 19-20 years. Out of the Northern Command HQ
nucleus, the GHQ was organised at its present location. LtGen
Messervy, the then GOC-in-C Northern Command, was promoted and
appointed Commander-in-Chief (C-in-C) Pakistan Army. The GHQ started
functioning on 15 August 1947 without adequate staff or records, these
held back in New Delhi.

By August 1947, the 7th Division (located in Rawalpindi with two
brigades) was the Pakistan Army's only division. There also were
static HQ designated "Areas" and "Sub-areas", having brigades and
battalions at more than 50% below strength. In the following months,
as Pakistani personnel kept arriving from all over India, Middle East
and South East Asia by rail and sea, the 8th Division was organised
out of the Sind-Balochistan Area, and the 9th (F) Division was created
out of brigades of the Peshawar and Wazirstan Areas. Similarly, the
Lahore Area was re-organised as 10th Division, and the 12th Division
was raised in November 1948. The forces in East Pakistan (now
Bangladesh) were designated as East Pakistan Army, then a Sub-area and
finally in December 1948 as HQ 14th Division, initially with only two
battalions that eventually were built up to brigade strength. By
October 1947, guarding 5,000 miles of West and East Pakistan's
frontiers were about ten infantry brigades at less then 50% strength,
and an armoured brigade with only 13 running STUART tanks. The Army
has ammunition reserves for less than one week. In a Joint Defence
Council Meeting, both Mountbatten and Supreme Commander Auchinleck had
made it clear to Pakistan that in case of war with India, no other
member of the Commonwealth would come to Pakistan's help. Field
Marshal Ayub Khan, the first Pakistani C-in-C, was to recall in later
years: "It would always be a matter of pride and glory for this army
when history will recall how heavy a burden was placed on its young
shoulders and how creditably it always rose to the occasion".

After the fraudulent accession of Kashmir by the Maharaja on 27
October, Mountbatten and Nehru air-launched the Indian Army into the
Srinagar Valley. The India Army's offensive was halted at the
Ceasefire Line (now Line of Control) initially by Azad Kashmir Forces,
and from April 1948 with support of the ill-organised Pakistan Army
without adequate logistic support. At midnight on 30 December, GHQ
India asked for a ceasefire to become effective on 1 January 1949.
Pakistan accepted, as the fate of Jammu and Kashmir had been taken
over by the UNO. Thus ended the six-month war in Kashmir. By the end
of 1948 five infantry divisions had been organised, but these were
still lacking their full complement of supporting arms and services.
The few artillery regiments received at partition were grouped into
three Artillery Groups under independent headquarters to ensure
maximum flexibility. By early 1949, the Pakistan Army had completed
its formative stage and had been bloodied in battle experience, and
continued its re-organisation. On integration of Bahawalpur State in
January 1949, the 6th (B) Division was created, but this was disbanded
in 1956 on the re-organisation of the army.

Evolution And Conflicts
Back in August 1947, Quaid-e-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah, foreseeing the
financial and military difficulties ahead, asked for US economic and
military aid. Incidentally, the same request had also been submitted
by New Delhi and Kabul. After an evaluation of Pakistan's strategic
location at the crossroads of South-, Central-and West Asia in
proximity to both China and the Soviet Union, the USA acceded to
Pakistan's request under the American Mutual Security Legislation. In
early 1954, Pakistan and the USA signed a Mutual Defence Assistance
Agreement.

Between 1954-1965, Pakistan received US$650 million in military
grants, US$619 million in defence support assistance, and US$55
million in cash or commercial purchases. This aid enhanced Pakistani
defence capability by increasing the firepower and mobility, and
improving C3I facilities of five and a half divisions. The armed
forces were modernised in keeping with the world trends; two Corps HQ
were also catered for. Many senior and junior officers went for
training and orientation to USA; new cantonments were built, and
existing ones were expanded and modernised.

The Ran of Kutch Conflict (April 1965)

India and Pakistan became engaged in a short but sharp conflict into
Pakistani claimed-area in the Ran of Kutch in April 1965. Both armies
had fully mobilised. Pakistan eventually proposed a ceasefire, which
India accepted; an agreement was signed, and the forces disengaged.
The Award by the Arbitration Tribunal vindicated Pakistan's position.
India then shifted the centre of gravity of operations to the Northern
Areas.

The Kashmir War (September 1965)

After several ceasefire violations, India attacked across the
international border from Sialkot to Sind sectors. The attacks were
halted on all fronts, and in a series of counter-attacks the Pakistan
Army penetrated six-eight miles inside Indian territory capturing more
territory than the Indian Army. The biggest tank battle since World
War II was fought at Chawinda, inflicting heavy casualties. India
eventually asked for a ceasefire, arranged by the UN on 23 September
1965.

The Third Evolution Phase (1966 - 1970)

In 1966, commenced the third phase of the evolution of the Pakistan
Army, which was able to at least partially enhance its defence
capability over these five years. The US embargo on military aid to
Pakistan, and the continued Soviet heavy build-up of Indian forces,
forced Pakistan to turn China, North Korea, Germany, Italy and France
for its defence procurement programmes. China, a time-tested friend
and neighbour, enabled Pakistan to raise three fully equipped infantry
divisions with gun and vehicles, 900 Chinese tanks, and MiG-19F
aircraft for the air force. France supplied MIRAGE aircraft and
submarines. In 1968, the Soviet Union offered US$30 million worth of
aid to Pakistan and supplied 100 T-55 tanks, Mi-8 helicopters, guns
and vehicles; in 1969, however, Soviet support was abruptly stopped
under Indian pressure.

The 1971 War

1971 was the most tragic year in Pakistan's history, a year of
political crises and conflict. Unable to resolve a political problem
by political means, the then Martial Law regime resorted to Military
action in East Pakistan on the night on 25/26 March. Widespread
insurgency broke out, covertly aided by Indian trained infiltrators
and India's Border Security Forces. In the first week of April,
personnel of two infantry divisions and civil armed forces were
airlifted in Pakistan International Airlines (PIA) planes with a
6,000-mile non-stop route via Sri Lanka - the longest operational air
move by the army. Quick reaction by the Pakistani authorities restored
80% normalcy in the eastern wing of the country. Covert operations
having failed, India concentrated about 400,000 regular army personnel
in 12 divisions supported by five tank regiments, seven air force
squadrons and Indian Navy. These forces, further strengthened by about
100,000 guerrilla (Mukti Bahini) attacked from all directions on 20
fronts across the international border on 21 November, without a
formal declaration of war. Intense fighting raged till 16 December in
both Pakistan's wings; no town or battalion position could be overrun,
till a ceasefire accepted by Pakistan was perfidiously changed into
surrender by Indian-Soviet machinations.

1979 To Present

In December 1979, the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan. The US offered
US$400 million worth of military aid, which was however spurned by
Pakistan as inadequate for a "frontline state". Apprehensive of the
two front threats to Pakistan, in 1981 the US again offered a package
of US$1.5 billion worth of military aid. This was accepted and in five
years provided 40 F-16 fighters, 100 M-48 tanks, 64 M-109 155mm SP
howitzers, 40 M-110 203mm SP howitzers, 75 towed howitzers, and 1,005
TOW anti-tank missile system, considerably enhancing Pakistan's
defence capability. In 1984, Indian forces, violating the 1949
Ceasefire Agreement and the 1972 Simla Accord, launched a military
aggression into the Siachen Glacier. Pakistan's fast counter-move
against their aggression blocked a threat from developing to
Pakistan's strategically vital Northern Areas and the Karakoram
Highway. India and Pakistan are now engaged into a military conflict
on the world's highest battlefield.

By 1989, the Soviet Union - having suffered heavy losses in men and
material, and unable to withstand the Jehad - commenced withdrawing
its forces from Afghanistan. Under the Pressler Amendment, the US
again imposed an embargo on all economical and military aid to
Pakistan, which continued for five years. In 1995, the Brown Amendment
authorised a one-time delivery of US military equipment, contracted
for prior to October 1990, worth US$368 million. However, the
additional 28 F-16 aircraft costing US$658 million and already paid
for by Pakistan were not delivered.

Concluding Remarks
The Pakistan Army, like Pakistan, started virtually from a scratch on
14 August 1947, in the face of heavy odds. During these 50 years, the
army, like the navy and air force, has evolved into a highly motivated
and modern force defending the ideological and geographical frontiers
of Pakistan. Today, almost 66 infantry brigades, 15 armoured brigades,
30 artillery brigades, eight air defence brigades, 17 army aviation
squadrons, all equipped with state-of-the-art weapon systems,
organised under about 19 division HQs and 9 Corps HQs, stand alert and
ready as to Warden of the Marches.

ISI Chief confronts CIA counterpart with evidence

2009-11-24T00:09:00.000-08:00

ISI Chief confronts CIA counterpart with evidence
By: Maqbool Malik | Published: November 21, 2009

ISLAMABAD – Serious differences are understood to have cropped up between Pakistan’s premier intelligence agency ISI and US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) over the latter’s dismal role in countering terrorism in Pakistan, TheNation reliably learnt on Friday.
According to well-placed sources, the differences between the two strategic partners in war against terror cropped up when ISI Chief Lt. General Ahmed Shujja Pasha in a meeting expressed his disappointment to his US counterpart, the CIA chief spymaster Leon Panetta, over the US failure to help Pakistan in counter-terrorism efforts.
Although there was no official confirmation either from the US Embassy or ISPR about the meeting, it was learnt that both of them had thought provoking talks here in which General Pasha had presented to the CIA official a shocking evidence about Indian interference into Pakistan by using Afghanistan soil. General Pasha, the informed sources said, had presented the evidence about Indian efforts aiding terrorism in Balochistan and Waziristan.
The sources said that General Pasha was critical to the CIA’s counter-terrorism strategy in Afghanistan and CIA’s failure to provide concrete actionable information to Pakistan in containing flow of aid to terror networks operating from Afghanistan to destabilize Pakistan.
The sources said that the CIA chief is currently visiting Pakistan as a follow-up to the visit of US of Secretary of State Hillary Clinton to address complains of Pakistan’s military establishment.
The CIA chief is to meet Army Chief General Ashfaq Pavez Kayani today and is likely to get the similar input from him, the sources said. He is also expected to visit Saudi Arabia before his return to USA.